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Droughts, Floods, and Wildfires:
Paleo Perspectives on Disaster Law in the
Anthropocene
RYAN B. STOA*
ABSTRACT
Humanity's impact on the earth has become so pronounced that momentum is
building toward adopting a new term for the modem geological age-the "Anthropo-
cene." The term signifies that human activity has reached a scale that it is now a
planetary force capable of shaping ecosystems and natural processes. And yet,
anthropocentric natural resources management and environmental lawmaking in the
United States reveal a lack of control in managing natural systems and fostering
resilience to extreme events. These systems do not easily conform to the whims of
reactionary environmental policies. Droughts, floods, and wildfires, in particular, are
often conceptualized as unforeseeable disasters when in fact their occurrence is a
typical feature of the American landscape. The manner in which environmental laws
have evolved to respond to these natural systems reveals a strong belief that nature can
be adapted to modem human activities, instead of adapting human activities to nature.
Legal frameworks are consequently reactive in disposition when control proves
impossible, relying on subsidized insurance programs and disaster relieffunds that do
little to build resilience. This article examines contemporary legal doctrines and
policies governing management of droughts, floods, and wildfires from a paleoenviron-
mental and paleoanthropological perspective. Modern approaches and reforms can be
assessed through a conceptual model provided by hundreds of thousands of years of
hunter-gatherer resilience strategies. The resilience model suggests that drought, flood,
and wildfire laws can more adequately enhance societal resilience by prioritizing
mobility, diversification, and awareness of changes in the surrounding environment.
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INTRODUCTION
Within the first seven months of 2014, the U.S. Federal Emergency Manage-
ment Agency ("FEMA") had issued thirteen separate major disaster declarations
due to flooding, including states in the American West, Mississippi River Delta,
and Eastern Seaboard regions. 1 The U.S. Forest Service was so preoccupied with
fighting wildfires that firefighting funds were exhausted, forcing officials to tap
into wildfire prevention funds instead.2 Meanwhile, by February 2015, 822
counties in the United States had been declared "drought disaster counties" by the
U.S. Department of Agriculture,3 including all counties in California, Nevada,
New Mexico, Arizona, and Utah, and most counties in Texas, Oklahoma, Kansas,
Colorado, Idaho, Washington, and Oregon.4
Various state governors issued their own disaster or state of emergency
declarations due to flooding, drought, or wildfire, allowing them to invoke special
powers or tap into extraordinary funds. California governor Jerry Brown declared
a drought state of emergency in January 2014, asking residents to cut their water
1. Disaster Declarations for 2014, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, http://www.fema.gov/disasters/grid/
year/2014 (last visited Apr. 28, 2015).
2. Kevin Freking, Money Allocated for Fighting Fires to Run Out, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 5, 2014, 4:13
PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/money-allocated- suppressing-fires-run-out.
3. U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., SECRETARIAL DISASTER DESIGNATIONS 2014 CROP YEAR ALL (last updated Feb. 25,
2015), http://www.usda.gov/documents/2014-all-crop-list-counties.pdf.
4. U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., 2014 SECRETARIAL DROUGHT DESIGNATIONS ALL DROUGHT (July 16, 2014),
http://www.usda.gov/documents/usda-drought-fast-track-designations-071614.pdf.
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consumption by twenty percent.5 Governors in Oregon and Washington declared
wildfire states of emergency in July following widespread burning across the
region.6 In Florida, over $66 million of disaster relief was disbursed within sixty
days of a May 6 flooding disaster declaration requested by Governor Rick Scott.
7
New York Governor Andrew Cuomo secured $28 million to repair flood-
damaged infrastructure after declaring a State Disaster Emergency in May.8
Public discourse has mirrored the political declarations with headlines that
conceptualize the droughts, floods, and wildfires of 2014 as unprecedented
natural disasters. 9 Despite the rhetoric, however, FEMA issues hundreds of
disaster declarations every year.10 In 2011, for instance, 242 such declarations
were made, 114 of which were wildfire-related.11 The reality is that droughts,
floods, and wildfires are cyclical ecological processes. In fact, many ecosystems
depend on the cycle of droughts, floods, and wildfires to maintain balance
between species. 12 If these events are disasters, they are decidedly human ones.
Unpredictable natural disasters are a convenient scapegoat for the damage
caused to people and the U.S. economy, but a more rigorous examination reveals
a policy infrastructure that fails to appreciate the inevitability of large-scale
natural events. Instead, laws designed to address droughts, floods, and wildfires
5. Ian Lovett, California Approves Forceful Steps Amid Drought, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2014), http://
www.nytimes.com/2014/07/16/us/forceful-steps-amid-a-severe-drought.html.
6. Joanna M. Foster, Oregon, Washington Declare States of Emergency as Wildfires Spread, CLIMATE
PROGRESS (July 17, 2014, 9:57 AM), http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2014/07/17/3461159/state-of-emergency-
wildfires-grow/.
7. Disaster Assistance for Florida Reaches More than $65 Million in 60 Days, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT.
AGENCY (July 3, 2014), https://www.fema.gov/news-release/2014/07/03/disaster-assistance-florida-reaches-more-
65-million-60-days.
8. Governor Cuomo Announces Federal Approval of Major Disaster Declaration Request Following Recent
Storms and Flooding in Central and Western New York, OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR OF NEW YORK (July 8, 2014),
http://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomo-announces-federal-approval-major-disaster-declaration-
request-following-recent.
9. See, e.g., Sam Stanton, California Braces as Drought Sparks Early Fire Season, EMERGENCY MGMT. (July
14, 2014), http://www.emergencymgmt.com/disaster/California-Drought-Sparks-Early-Fire-Season.html; Jen-
nifer Welsh, California's Drought Is 'The Greatest Water Loss Ever Seen, 'and the Effects Will Be Severe, Bus.
INSIDER (July 15, 2014, 1:50 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/californias-drought-cost-state-22-billion-
2014-7; Maria L. LaGanga & Michael Muskal, Washington Wildfire, Biggest in State History, Claims First
Fatality, L.A. TIMES (July 21, 2014, 12:52 PM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-washington-
wildfires-death-20140721-story.html; Floods Sweep Across Midwest States as Rains Swamp Missouri and
Illinois, GUARDIAN (July 1, 2014, 2:42 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/juI1/floods-rain-storms-
midwest-illinois-missouri-chicago.
10. Disaster Declarations by Year, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, https://www.fema.gov/disasters/grid/
year (last visited Apr. 28, 2015).
11. Id.
12. See, e.g., BETH MIDDLETON, FLOOD PULSING IN WETLANDS: RESTORING THE NATURAL HYDROLOGICAL
BALANCE 1 (Beth A. Middleton, ed. 2002) (surveying floodplain ecosystem restoration); HENRY A. WRIGHT &
ARTHUR W. BAILEY, FIRE ECOLOGY: UNITED STATES AND SOUTHERN CANADA 1 (1982) (describing the role of fire
in balanced forest ecosystems); Nate McDowell et al., Mechanisms of Plant Survival and Mortality During
Drought: Why Do Some Plants Survive While Others Succumb to Drought?, 178 NEW PHYTOLOGIST 719, 720
(2008) (exploring drought-induced tree mortality and survival).
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conceptualize them as unpredictable or unlikely natural disasters, prioritizing
insurance schemes and emergency assistance funds instead of integrated disaster
planning mechanisms that prepare communities for the inevitable. What proac-
tive planning measures do exist typically exhibit ambitious, anthropocentric
characteristics. Interstate water transfers and irrigation channels, dikes, dams,
and levees, and large-scale fire suppression networks are temporary fixes, but fail
to address the larger, structural dynamics that make human populations and the
economy vulnerable to droughts, floods, and wildfires in the first place. When
those command-and-control approaches deteriorate or fail, reactive measures like
subsidized insurance programs and disaster relief funds are provided to soften the
blow, but likewise do little to mitigate risk and build resilience.
Fortunately there are alternative approaches that can foster resilience. Because
droughts, floods, and wildfires have been occurring for millennia, the coping
mechanisms of our human ancestors provide a wealth of unexplored success
strategies that can be adapted to a contemporary context. This article takes the
broadest view possible, starting with primate ancestry and continuing through
millions of years of human evolution and hunter-gatherer societies. Because
homo sapiens survived for hundreds of thousands of years as nomadic hunter-
gatherers, identifying the strategies that fostered resilience to droughts, floods,
and wildfires provides a model for conceptualizing and correcting vulnerabilities
in our modern legal landscape. The resilience model suggests that legal frame-
works addressing droughts, floods, and wildfires can more effectively build
resilience by prioritizing mobility, diversification, and awareness of the surround-
ing environment. The model may be applied to other extreme natural events (e.g.,
tornados, volcanic eruptions, and earthquakes), but droughts, floods, and wild-
fires are a natural empirical starting point because of their cyclical regularity
across time. While some societies may or may not be exposed to volcanic
activity, for example, nearly all human communities have at one point or another
been faced with water shortages, inundations, or forest fires. Similarly, droughts,
floods, and wildfires expose vulnerabilities that silently develop over a period of
years or decades, making resilience particularly challenging.
This article examines U.S. drought, flood, and wildfire laws from a paleoenvironmen-
tal and paleoanthropological perspective. In Section I, a review of scientific literature
reveals that while climate change may be exacerbating the frequency and severity of
twenty-first century droughts, floods, and wildfires, their occurrence has been a fixture
of the natural environment for millennia. Section II builds on a finding of extreme
events' regularity to explore human approaches across time. A review of hunter-
gatherer coping mechanisms reveals a resilience model that prioritizes mobility,
diversification, and awareness of the surrounding environment. Conversely, agricul-
tural societies exhibit vulnerability to droughts, floods, and wildfires because they were
static, heavily reliant on one resilience approach, and could not integrate changes in the
environment into societal decision-making. In Section III, drought, flood, and wildfire
laws and policies are examined in detail. The resilience pillars of these legal regimes
[Vol. 27:393
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conform to three general approaches: First, reliance on anthropocentric infrastructure or
management paradigms that attempt to control nature; second, subsidized or government-
backed insurance programs that spread risk across society; and third, generous disaster
relief funds that partially rehabilitate communities when disaster strikes. Unfortunately,
these approaches do little to mitigate risk and promote resilience. Alternative frame-
works are proposed in Section 1V by viewing contemporary vulnerabilities through the
lens of the paleoanthropological resilience model. By promoting mobility, diversifying
policies, and integrating environmental change into decision-making, modern drought,
flood, and wildfire laws can significantly enhance societal resilience. Until these laws
align themselves with the realities of underlying environmental dynamics, however,
people and property will continue to suffer.
I. DROUGHTS, FLOODS, AND WILDFIRES: FROM PLEISTOCENE TO ANTHROPOCENE
The first indication that the U.S. disaster policy infrastructure is out of touch
with environmental processes is the fact that droughts, floods, and wildfires are
perceived as disasters in the first place. 13 Their impact may be disastrous, 14 but
these natural events have long been a fixture of the American landscape. Heavy
rains that cause floods, drops in precipitation associated with drought, and
wildland forest fires have been occurring on a cyclical basis for hundreds of
thousands of years. 15 By surviving to the present day, plant and animal species
have successfully adapted to droughts, floods, and wildfires, and in many cases
depend on them to maintain a balanced ecosystem. 16 While human societies have
been confronted with these natural events for hundreds of thousands of years,
contemporary American lifestyles-characterized by immobile urban and agricul-
tural development and a proclivity for living close to water bodies-is not
particularly well-suited to withstand extreme environmental events.
13. See, e.g., Disaster Declarations for 2014, supra note 1; Freking, supra note 2; U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC.,
supra note 3.
14. Even disaster designations themselves, however, are subjective and sometimes political. See Jeff Guo,
How Droughts Are Like Recessions, WASH. POST (July 21, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/storyline/
wp/2014/07/17/how-droughts-are-like-recessions/.
15. See generally Daniel G. Gavin et al., Forest Fire and Climate Change in Western North America:
Insights from Sediment Charcoal Records, 5 FRONTIERS ECOLOGY & ENVT 499, 500-01, 503-04 (2007); 0.
Pechony & D.T. Shindell, Driving Forces of Global Wildfires Over the Past Millennium and the Forthcoming
Century, PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCIS., 19167, 19167 (2010); Edward R. Cook et al., Drought Reconstructions for
the Continental United States, 12 J. CLIMATE 1145, 1145 (1999); Anders J. Noren et al., Millennial-Scale
Storminess Variability in the Northeastern United States During the Holocene Epoch, 419 NATURE 821 (2002);
Yehouda Enzel & Stephen G. Wells, Exacting Holocene Paleohydrology and Paleoclimatology Information
from Modern Extreme Flood Events: An Example from Southern California, 19 GEOMORPHOLOGY 203 (1997);
Noam Greenbaum et al., A 2000 Year Natural Record of Magnitudes and Frequencies for the Largest Upper
Colorado River Floods Near Moab, Utah, 50 WATER RES. RESEARCH 5249 (2014); Victor R. Baker, Paleoflood
Hydrology: Origin, Progress, Prospects, 101 GEOMORPHOLOGY 1 (2008); Thomas C. Peterson et al., Monitoring
and Understanding Changes in Heat Waves, Cold Waves, Floods, and Droughts in the United States, 94 BULL.
AM. METEROLOGICAL SOCY 821, 830 (2013).
16. Id.; see MIDDLETON, supra note 12; WRIGHT & BAILEY, supra note 12; McDowell et al., supra note 12.
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Accordingly, when infrastructure designed to control droughts, floods, and
wildfires is overwhelmed, it is easy to deduce that the event was unpredictable or
unlikely. 17 Recently, discourse surrounding natural disasters has focused on
climate change, and the degree to which extreme events are being exacerbated by
anthropogenic activity. While there is certainly ample evidence that a build-up of
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere may be increasing the frequency or severity
of droughts, floods, and wildfires to some degree, the highly politicized nature of
the climate change debate overshadows a more critical matter. Droughts, floods,
and wildfires are cyclical fixtures of the natural environment. They have occurred
for millions of years and are likely to continue occurring for the foreseeable
future. The notion that a drought, flood, or wildfire cannot be predicted-thereby
justifying reactionary laws and policies-is not supported by available evi-
dence. 18 In this section, a review of scientific literature reveals that droughts,
floods, and wildfires occur regularly in the natural environment, and justify a
more proactive and integrated approach to disaster planning.
A. DROUGHTS 1 9
Many observers are understandably alarmed by the severity of current drought
conditions in the United States. As of May 6, 2014, half of the United States was
in a state of drought.20 A year earlier, eighty-one percent of the country was also
in a state of drought. 21 Looking further back, half of the country has been in
drought for half of the weeks from 2000 to 2014.22 Droughts throughout the
1990s caused billions of dollars in agricultural damages. 23 Drought-related
17. A common refrain is the fallacy of the "100-year" or "500-year" flood, an often misunderstood term of
legal significance. See Experts: Term '100- Year'Flood Misleads Public, NBC NEWS, http://www.nbcnews.com/
id/25463476#.U-FYWPldWmg (last updated June 30, 2008, 7:42 PM).
18. Id. See generally supra note 15; Philip Bump, What's Exceptional About the Current Drought And
What Isn't, WASH. POST BLOG (May 17, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2014/05/17/
whats-exceptional-about-the-current-drought-and-what-isnt/; Justin Sheffield et al., Little Change in Global
Drought Over the Past 60 Years, 491 NATURE 435, 437 (2012); P.C.D. Milly et al., Stationarity Is Dead: Whither
Water Management?, Sci., 573, 573 (2008).
19. The various definitions and conceptualizations of "drought" are explored in detail in Section I. For
purposes of this sub-section, drought is defined in meteorological terms, i.e., as a reduction in precipitation over
time relative to a baseline. See, e.g., Robert W. Adler, Balancing Compassion and Risk in Climate Adaptation:
U.S. Water Drought, and Agricultural Law, 64 FLA. L. REv. 201, 209-13 (2012). See generally Donald A.
Wilhite & Michael H. Glantz, Understanding the Drought Phenomenon: The Role of Definitions, 10 WATER
INT'L 111-20 (1985).
20. Drought Recorded Across Half of the U.S., NAT'L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN. (May 13, 2014),
http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/IOTD/view.php?id 83650.
21. Brad Plumer, Five Maps ofAmerica's Massive Drought, Vox, http://www.vox.com/2014/5/15/5720870/
drought-california-us-maps (last updated May 15, 2014, 4:40 PM).
22. Bump, supra note 18.
23. Billion Dollar Disasters: A Chronology of U.S. Events, LIVESCiENCE (Jan. 31, 2004, 2:00 AM),
http://www.livescience.com/114-billion-dollar-disasters-chronology-events.html.
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damages in 1980 and 1988 may have been the costliest in history.24 Various
regions of the United States experienced severe droughts throughout the 1950s,
1960s, and 1970s, including the American West, Northeast, and Southwest. The
infamous Great Plains Dust Bowl of the 1930s was catastrophic for the U.S.
economy and was exacerbated by poor agricultural practices.26 A century of data
shows that droughts can occur virtually anywhere, and often quite regularly.
27
The last one hundred years, however, have not been uniquely dry; 28 droughts
in the twentieth century may actually have been less severe and shorter in
duration than in previous centuries. 29 A survey of research examining historical
documents, tree rings, archaeological remains, lake sediment, and geomorphic
data presents evidence that major multiyear droughts have occurred naturally
once or twice a year in the United States since the seventeenth century,
30
including several that surpassed twentieth century droughts in duration and
intensity. 31 In the second half of the sixteenth century and the last quarter of
the thirteenth century, much of the United States experienced multidecadal
"megadroughts" that likely exceeded twentieth century droughts in severity,
duration, and spatial scale.32 These megadroughts are exceeded only by four
even more severe droughts in the period 1 A.D. to 1200 A.D.33 The data
suggests that the contemporary experience with drought in the United States
is not representative of the full range of potential drought conditions in North
America. While contemporary droughts wreak havoc on the U.S. economy,
34
they are relatively moderate in severity and duration by first millennium
standards; a megadrought from the first millennium would likely precipitate a
level of devastation the U.S. legal and societal infrastructure is not equipped
to withstand.
24. See MICHAEL J. HAYES ET AL., ESTIMATING THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF DROUGHT 1 (2004), available at
https://ams.confex.com/ams/pdfpapers/73004.pdf.
25. See Cook et al., supra note 15, at 1145.
26. See Zeynep K. Hansen & Gary D. Libecap, Small Farms, Externalities, and the Dust Bowl of the 1930s,
112 J. POL. ECON. 665, 687 (2004).
27. See generally Cook et al., supra note 15.
28. The percent area of the contiguous United States experiencing moderate-to-extreme drought from
January 1900 to October 2012 shows that widespread persistent drought occurred in the 1930s (central and
northern Great Plains, Northwest, and Midwest), 1950s (southern Great Plains and Southwest), 1980s (West and
Southeast), and the first decade of the twenty-first century (West and Southeast). Peterson et al., supra note 15,
at 827 fig. 4.
29. Connie A. Woodhouse & Jonathan T. Overpeck, 2000 Years of Drought Variability in the Central United
States, 79 BULL. AM. METEOROLOGICAL Soc'Y 2693, 2706 (1998).
30. Id. at 2698.
31. Id. at 2697.
32. Id. at 2698-2704.
33. Id. at 2704.
34. See, e.g., Ya Ding et al., Measuring Economic Impacts of Drought: A Review and Discussion, 20
DISASTER PREVENTION & MGMT: INT'L J. 434 (2011).
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With climate change discourse becoming increasingly politicized and vitri-
olic, 35 it is important to remember that severe droughts are not solely a function
of human-caused warming and a more unpredictable climate; droughts have
occurred for thousands of years 36 and will likely continue to do so. It is
imperative to approach drought management as a serious and continuous en-
deavor in that regard, regardless of climate change discourse. It is also relevant to
note that droughts are notoriously difficult to define and measure. Many
climate-related variables affect drought, such as precipitation, temperature,
stream discharge, and soil moisture. 38 However, evidence is accumulating that
droughts in the United States are likely to become longer and more severe as
temperatures rise.39
By downscaling global temperature and precipitation models and integrating
regional data, models can estimate future drought scenarios.40 In the western
United States, for example, a midrange greenhouse gas emissions scenario
41
would create twenty-first century droughts that are significantly longer, larger,
and more severe than twentieth-century droughts.42 In addition, future droughts
are likely to be increasingly temperature-driven-as opposed to precipitation-
driven-than historical droughts were, making recovery from droughts more
difficult as warmer climates cause increased evaporation.43 Extrapolating drought
projections from climate models cannot provide exact predictions for complex
phenomena,44 and it is not clear that causal assumptions about temperature
increases leading to drought are accurate; it is plausible that drought drives
temperature increases due to a decrease in evaporative cooling instead.
In any case, debating the degree to which climate change will increase the
duration, extent, and severity of future droughts in the United States misses the
point. What is most important is to recognize that drought is neither a recent
phenomenon nor a temporary experience. Extreme drought conditions have
occurred in the United States for millennia, and will continue to occur for the
foreseeable future. This reality has had, and will continue to have, severe
implications for water resources and agricultural policy.
35. See generally Maxwell T. Boykoff & Jules M. Boykoff, Climate Change and Journalistic Norms: A
Case-Study of U.S. Mass-Media Coverage, 38 GEOFORUM 1190 (2007) (examining the disconnect between
climate change science and its portrayal in the media).
36. See Peterson et al., supra note 15, at 827 fig. 4.
37. See supra text accompanying note 19.
38. Peterson et al., supra note 15, at 827.
39. See David S. Gutzler & Tessia 0. Robbins, Climate Variability and Projected Change in the Western
United States: Regional Downscaling and Drought Statistics, 37 CLIMATE DYNAMICS 835, 835 (2011).
40. See id.
41. See id. at 837.
42. See id. at 847.
43. Id.
44. Gutzler & Robbins, for example, describe their methods as "an extremely simple approach." Id.
45. Sheffield et al., supra note 18, at 437.
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B. FLOODS
Like droughts, floods have been a fixture of the North American landscape for
centuries. Unlike droughts, which can be defined in purely meteorological terms,
flooding can result from land use and water management practices in addition to
meteorological changes in precipitation and temperature. 6 Extensive develop-
ment of agricultural lands, urbanization, and hydrological installations like dams
and levees in the twentieth century have dramatically altered floodplains and
surrounding ecosystems, making it challenging to assess historical flood trends.4 7
Furthermore, one of the most basic principles of flood frequency analysis-that
hydrologic regimes remain "stationary" and conform to independent and identi-
cally distributed random processes-has been called into question in recent
years,48 and with it, the value of historical flood records.49 Consequently, trends
regarding the magnitude or frequency of floods are more difficult to ascertain
than droughts or wildfires.
Nonetheless, streamgauge measurements and paleoflood records can be used
to observe changes in precipitation and flood patterns independent of human
activity. For the past century or so, as the principle of stationarity would predict,
flood magnitudes have been relatively stable. 50 Total annual precipitation in the
51United States has increased by five percent on average over the past fifty years,
but increased precipitation did not lead to increased flooding in all areas.5 2
However, regional analyses indicate that the severity of flooding depends on local
conditions. The Southwest, for example, may have experienced a decrease in
flood magnitudes due to lower precipitation levels over the past 120 years, while
precipitation and flooding in the northern Midwest has been increasing. 3
Paleohydrology is a nascent discipline, 4 but provides compelling evidence
that extreme and frequent flooding has been common in North America for
thousands of years. Large floods have been an increasingly frequent characteris-
46. Peterson et al., supra note 15, at 825.
47. See id.
48. See Jery R. Stedinger & Veronica W. Griffis, Getting From Here to Where?, Flood Frequency Analysis
and Climate, 47 J. AM. WATER RES. Ass'N 506, 510 (2011) (affirming the value of historical records but noting
that factors like climate change, urbanization, and development may result in nonstationarity).
49. See, e.g., P.C.D. Milly et al., supra note 18, at 573 (rejecting the stationarity assumption). But see
Gabriele Villarini et al., On the Stationarity ofAnnual Flood Peaks in the Continental United States During the
20th Century, 45 WATER RES. RESEARCH, no. 8, 2009, at 1 (rejecting the assumption may be overblown or
premature).
50. Villarini et al., supra note 49, at 12.
51. Peterson et al., supra note 15, at 826.
52. New England, for example, has experienced a significant increase in days with heavy precipitation, but
that trend does not correlate with increased flooding, possibly because local flooding events depend on sustained
rainfall over time, or because precipitation increases are taking place during seasons when flooding is rare. See
id. at 825-26.
53. Peterson et al., supra note 15, at 826 fig. 3.
54. See generally Baker, supra note 15, at 1.
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tic of the Colorado River Basin over the past two thousand years. 55 Similarly,
New England lake deposits suggest that extreme flooding events have been
occurring regularly for thousands of years,56 while increases in flood magnitude
over the past six hundred years may be taking place independently of anthropo-
genic activity.57 Flooding in the Mojave River Basin that likely eclipsed the
magnitude and frequency of modern floods shaped Southern California's geogra-
phy. 58 There is little evidence that extreme floods are only the result of
developments in the twentieth or twenty-first centuries; rather, flooding has
occurred for centuries with and without the presence of human activities, and it is
highly likely to continue.
Placing extreme flooding in historical perspective is important because ex-
treme events experienced today may play a large role in shaping disaster
planning. It is equally important, however, to assess future flooding scenarios and
trends in flood patterns given global environmental changes such as rising
temperatures. Because of the complexity of hydrological dynamics as well as the
high degree of human interference in surface water systems, there is a paucity of
information regarding flood trends generally; data relating to the impact of
climate change is even scarcer.59 The 5th Assessment Report of the Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change ("IPCC") in 2013 characterized the state of
understanding regarding flood trends as having "low agreement" and therefore
"low confidence" regarding changes in the magnitude or frequency of flood
events on a global scale.60 The best substitute may be precipitation data, keeping
in mind that extreme precipitation events do not always lead to floods.6'
That said, fundamental principles of climatology correlate rising atmospheric
temperatures with increases in precipitation: warmer air can hold more moisture,
increasing the amount of potential rainfall. There has been a marked increase in
extreme precipitation events in the United States over the past fifty years. 62 The
central United States is the only region in the world that the IPCC Report deems
,.very likely" to have experienced increases in the frequency or intensity of heavy
precipitation. 63 That conclusion is verified by increases in one-day extreme
55. See Greenbaum et al., supra note 15, at 5249.
56. Noren et al., supra note 15, at 823.
57. Id.
58. Enzel & Wells, supra note 15, at 217.
59. See generally Dennis L. Hartmann et al., Observations: Atmosphere and Surface, in CLIMATE CHANGE
2013: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS (T.F. Stoker et al. eds., 2013), available at http://www.climatechange2013.org/
images/reportWG1AR5_Chapter02_FINAL.pdf; Stedinger & Griffis, supra note 48.
60. See Hartmann et al., supra note 59, at 213-14.
61. See supra, text accompanying note 52.
62. U.S. Climate Extremes Index, NAT'L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/
extremes/cei/graph/us/4/01-12 (last visited Apr. 28, 2015); accord Climate Change Indicators in the United
States, ENVTL. PRo. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/science/indicators/weather-climate/heavy-
precip.html (last updated May 2014).
63. Hartmann et al., supra note 59, at 213.
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precipitation events recorded by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration.64
Indications that extreme precipitation events are increasing in the United
States, and that this trend may lead to increases in flooding, make a coherent legal
framework capable of adapting to this reality more necessary than ever. The paleo
record, which shows consistent flooding across temporal and spatial dimensions,
confirms this necessity. Ultimately, however, whether floods are becoming
marginally more severe or more frequent than they were fifty years ago is less
notable than the fact that their occurrence is and always has been a characteristic
of the North American landscape. Floods have shaped the United States year after
year. That they continue to do so should not be surprising.
C. WILDFIRES
Compared to droughts and floods, the occurrence of wildfires is more heavily
influenced by human activity. While water management and land use may
influence vulnerability to droughts and floods, the absence or presence of water in
both extremes is largely a product of meteorological processes. As the above
discussion reveals, the occurrence of droughts and floods involves a complex
interaction between air, surface, and soil dynamics as well, complicating our
understanding of causal connections and historical trends. The scientific litera-
ture shows that droughts and floods have been common in the United States for
centuries, but that fact alone does not point to a law or policy failure regarding
disaster management. In other words, if drought and flood law and policy is
problematic, it has not had a noticeable effect on the occurrence of droughts and
floods, meteorologically defined.
Wildfires, on the other hand, exhibit a more formulaic cause-and-effect
relationship. There are three ingredients necessary for a fire to occur: fuel, heat,
and oxygen.65 Atmospheric oxygen levels are difficult to manipulate, but fuel and
heat conditions are highly susceptible to changes in the environment and forest
management techniques. The various types of fuel (e.g., grass, brush, tree trunks,
and rotten logs) have little variance in chemical composition; what is important is
the moisture content and size of those fuels. The moisture content determines
how much heat is necessary to ignite the fuel, while the size of the fuel dictates
the ease with which that fuel reaches the ignition point.66 Dryer, finer fuels such
as grass, brush, and small trees are much easier to ignite than wetter, larger fuels.
Small fuels also combust more quickly, sending fires farther afield and faster
upwards than larger fuels, creating potentially devastating wind storms.67
64. See U.S. Climate Extremes Index, supra note 62.
65. H.T. Gisborne, Fundamentals of Fire Behavior, 64 FIRE MGMT. TODAY 15, 15 (2004).
66. Id. at 16.
67. Id. at 16-17.
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These dynamics implicate the risk of wildfires. Changes in the climate affect
moisture content, which in turn affects temperature, precipitation, and humidity.
These changes increase or decrease the amount of heat necessary to ignite fuel. At
the same time, human modifications to the size, quantity, or arrangement of fuels
can make it significantly easier or harder for fuel to ignite, combust, and spread.
In essence, climate change and forest management are two significant drivers of
wildfire risk; in the United States, this risk appears to be increasing in recent
decades. While the number of fires has been drastically reduced since the 1980s,
the extent of wildfires has steadily increased.68 In other words, there are now
fewer fires than there were in the twentieth century, but the fires that do occur are
much larger.69
These developments are likely the result of influences from climate change and
human intervention. On the one hand, observed temperature increases in the
United States simultaneously reduce moisture content in trees and soil while
expanding temporal fire windows. 70 This also makes forests more vulnerable to
insects and invasive species that kill and dry out indigenous species. 1 On the
other hand, widespread fire suppression as a forest management policy prefer-
ence has interfered with natural growth cycles that allow low-intensity fires to
reduce the quantity and density of fuels in forested areas and keep invasive
species at bay.72 As a result, forests accumulate fuel loads capable of generating
large, uncontrollable fires.
Historically, forests experience more frequent, low-intensity fires. In fact, the
natural recurrence of fire in a given forested area-the "historic fire return
interval"-provides many benefits to the ecosystem. Fires clear dead vegetation,
provide nutrients to the soil, reduce vegetation density, and allow sunlight to
reach the forest floor, allowing tree seedlings to grow. 73 At low intensities, these
types of fires provide little threat to mature trees and wildlife, and, from a human
perspective, reduce future wildlife suppression costs and damages.74 Prior to
large-scale human influence, fire regimes developed organically according to
regional ecological attributes (e.g., vegetation, topography, climate, etc.). 75
68. See Total Wildland Fires and Acres (1960-2009), NAT'L INTERAGENCY FIRE CTR., http://www.nifc.gov/
firelnfo/firelnfo stats totalFires.htmi (last visited Apr. 28, 2015).
69. See id.
70. Phillip J. van Mantgem et al., Climatic Stress Increases Forest Fire Severity Across the Western United
States, 16 ECOLOGY LETTERS 1151, 1151 (2013); see also David H. Freedman, America Is Burning: The Fight
Against Wildfires Gets Real, MEN'S J. (Aug. 2014), http://www.mensj ournal.com/magazine/america-is-burning-
the-fight- against-wildfires-gets-real-20140723 ?page = 2.
71. Freedman, supra note 70.
72. Scott L. Stephens et al., The Effects of Forest Fuel-Reduction Treatments in the United States,
BIOSCIENCE 549, 549 (2012).
73. See Geoffrey H. Donovan & Thomas C. Brown, Be Careful What You Wish For: The Legacy of Smokey
Bear, 5 FRONTIERS ECOLOGY & ENVT 73, 77 (2007).
74. See id.
75. See generally Gavin et al., supra note 15 (exploring environmental attributes driving fire intervals).
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Changes in these attributes led to decadal variation in fire frequency, but fire
activity remained relatively stable prior to 1800.76
The shift from frequent low-intensity fires to infrequent high-intensity fires is a
major turning point in the paleorecord of wildfires in the United States. However,
it is highly likely that anthropogenic activity has contributed to the shift and that
an increase in large fires was not an intended consequence of wildfire laws that
promoted those activities. Consequently, there is potential to reexamine wildfire
law in hopes of realigning current policies with symbiotic natural cycles. The
historical record also makes clear that defeating wildfire is not a realistic
objective. Unless forests are cleared in their entirety-a development that would
have devastating consequences for humans and the environment 77 -they will
either experience fires near their historic fire return interval or accumulate fuel
loads that increase the risk of large, high-intensity wildfires. Wildfire records
documenting the role of human intervention make clear that anthropogenic forces
heavily influence fire dynamics. The overall success of these interventions in
relation to human communities notwithstanding, the paleorecord tells a story of
the legacy of wildfire law.
D. COMMONALITIES
The historic occurrence of droughts and floods, in contrast, does not paint a
clear picture of the consequences of human intervention. Droughts and floods are
complex components of the water cycle and its extremes; many forces shape their
occurrence and severity. Consequently, the role of anthropogenic activities in
drought or flood frequency is less easily measured, and the productivity of
drought law and flood law must therefore be judged by the effects that these
policies have had on humans and the environment. The paleorecord of droughts and
floods should not be dismissed. On the contrary, the recurrence of droughts and floods
over thousands of years has critical implications. First, droughts and floods should not
be seen as irregular or unlikely events that are unworthy of serious legal or policy
consideration. Droughts and floods are fixtures of the American landscape and are
unlikely to dissipate anytime soon; it would be prudent to develop laws that are
responsive to their frequency rather than reactive to their occurrence. Second, droughts
and floods have occurred throughout the Holocene and its various climatic permuta-
tions. While anthropogenic climate change in the twenty-first century may influence the
frequency or severity of future events, droughts and floods should not be dismissed as
products of climate change. Because droughts and floods would occur regardless of
dramatic changes in climate, framing adaptation efforts solely in the context of climate
76. See Pechony & Shindell, supra note 15, at 19167.
77. See James Hamblin, The Health Benefits of Trees, ATLANTIC (July 29, 2014, 12:02 AM), http://
theatlantic.comlhealth/archive/2014/07/trees-good/375129/.
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change is misleading and likely unproductive. Climate change or no climate change,
droughts and floods must be addressed.
II. THE TRANSITION FROM HOMINIDS TO AGRICULTURALISTS: EVOLVING
APPROACHES TOWARD DROUGHTS, FLOODS, AND WILDFIRES
"For most of the history of our species we were helpless to understand how
nature works. We took every storm, drought, illness and comet personally. We
created myths and spirits in an attempt to explain the patterns of nature. 78
Ann Druyan
There is a common narrative about the relationship between humans and
natural disasters like droughts, floods, and wildfires. The narrative invariably
starts with the assumption that human populations have been victims of these
disasters since the dawn of our species' existence, living for thousands of years in
high-risk conditions. Somewhere around the turn of the twentieth century, so the
narrative continues, scientists and technocrats began discovering and implement-
ing grand new technologies capable of defeating nature's hazards. Thousands of
miles of irrigation canals were built to ensure water supplies in times of drought,
dams and levees were installed to protect homes and farmland from floods, and
extensive firefighting techniques were employed to suppress fires and eliminate
collateral damage. Today, the next chapter of the narrative opens with a heated
debate about climate change and its contribution to the failure of these systems to
protect us from disaster: from helpless ancient societies, to the triumph of human
ingenuity and ambition, to the return of a vindictive mother nature.7 9
The narrative is compelling, but misleading.80 Climate change might be
frustrating modern coping mechanisms, but it would be improvident to assume
that those mechanisms were flawlessly designed in the first place. Section III
below examines contemporary drought, flood, and wildfire law in the United
78. Understanding Pattern Formation During Morphogenesis, SCI. IN THE NEWS, HARVARD GRADUATE
SCHOOL OF THE ARTS & SciS. (July 3, 2012), http://sitn.hms.harvard.edu/flash/2012/morphogenesis/.
79. For a literary deconstruction of this narrative, see generally DANIEL QUINN, ISHMAEL: AN ADVENTURE OF
THE MIND AND SPIRIT (2d ed. 1995); DANIEL QUINN, STORY OF B (1997); DANIEL QUINN, MY ISHMAEL (2d ed.
1998).
80. Professor Jedediah Purdy provides an alternative framework for analyzing American understandings of
nature in American Natures: The Shape of Conflict in Environmental Law, 36 HARV. ENVTL L. REV. 169 (2012).
Purdy argues that four values have emerged from the American experience that motivate environmental
lawmaking. The first, providential republicanism, treats nature as existing for individual human use. Id. at 178.
Second, progressive management values technocratic public governance of natural resources in order to
maximize utility. Id. at 189. The era of romantic epiphany gave rise to the thought of nature as a source of, or
locale for, spirituality and contemplation. Id. at 199-200. Finally, advances in environmental science created a
sense of ecological interdependence. See id. at 207-08. This article does not dispute that framework, and in
many ways our modern drought, flood, and wildfire laws exhibit all four values. There is also, however, a rich
history of human relationships with nature whose experiences precede the pioneers of providential republican-
ism. Those experiences and their values are presented in this section in the context of drought, flood, and
wildfire adaptation.
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States and finds that, in many respects, those laws are not responsive to, or even
cognizant of, key aspects of the natural processes they purport to manage. These
shortcomings are in stark contrast to technological advances in fields like
hydrology, engineering, and forestry that could, in theory, complement less
anthropo-dominant legal frameworks. One force possibly frustrating reform is a
perception that anthropocentrism is the only feasible approach to environmental
management-that before humans had the ability to dominate environmental
processes, they suffered. The following section will deconstruct that belief by
showing that hunter-gatherer societies avoided suffering by remaining mobile,
diversifying their response strategies, and maintaining awareness of the surround-
ing environment. There are, remarkably, many examples of human communities
and civilizations adapting to droughts, floods, and wildfires in these unique,
productive ways. While these approaches may not be capable of large-scale
replication in every instance, the lessons of the past can inform the future.
A. HUNTER-GATHERER ADAPTATION STRATEGIES
Droughts and floods are so central to the human experience that we may owe
our existence to them in the first place. For millions of years, droughts have
forced animals to congregate around shrinking water sources, just as floods bring
them together on shrinking areas of dry ground. Our primate ancestors, living in
rainforests on the edge of these wetlands between four and seven million years
ago, would have found tremendous quantities of new foods by coming down
from trees to take advantage of droughts and floods.81 Between 2.9 and 2.4
million years ago, however, climate changes evaporated wetlands, resulting in
more seasonal precipitation; these changes favored a more bipedal hominid
capable of efficiently moving between sources of water. 82 Humans evolved from
this cycle of dry and wet seasons, becoming highly mobile in order to expand
their territorial range and increase the variety of available food. 3 As a result, a
large brain may have been needed to make an inventory of seasonal water
sources, while tools had to be developed to capitalize on food types (such as bone
marrow) that could not be accessed by the human body alone.84 The ability to
take advantage of droughts and floods during periods of climate variability
resulted in human occupancy of much of the eastern hemisphere by one million
years ago;85 as the world became drier between four-hundred-and-fifty thousand
and seventy thousand years ago, homo sapiens emerged, survived, and thrived as
rain-chasers. 6
81. CLIVE FINLAYSON, THE IMPROBABLE PRIMATE: How WATER SHAPED HUMAN EVOLUTION 12, 21 (2014).
82. Id. at 36-37.
83. See id. at 47.
84. Id. at 58.
85. Id. at 68.
86. Id. at 94.
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Many examples of this lifestyle reveal unique adaptation mechanisms to
droughts and floods-mechanisms that were often ignored and eradicated by
modern colonizers. In Australia, the Mardu people survived in largely desert
environments by maintaining a small, highly mobile population capable of
reacting to and exploiting changing conditions.8 7 During rainy periods, for
example, the population would splinter into even smaller groups to utilize
temporary water sources.88 This intimacy with the local environment had two
additional advantages: hunting and gathering was a common skill and not overly
burdensome; and decision-making was based on prevailing environmental condi-
tions and, therefore, collective.8 9 The Mardu demonstrate a hunter-gatherer
attribute that not only recognizes changes in the surrounding environment, but
also integrates those changes into community decision-making.
Similarly, the Chumash people of Southern California were able to withstand
periods of extreme drought and flooding by diversifying their food sources,
trading with their neighbors, and prioritizing population mobility.90 Adjusting
settlement locations during periods of heavy rains, droughts, or wildfires signifi-
cantly increased productivity by capitalizing on favorable conditions while
minimizing the damage caused by unfavorable conditions. Fostering diplomatic
relations with neighbors, meanwhile, diversified the policy base by providing an
external coping mechanism when extreme events marginalized self-reliance.
When hunter-gatherers deviated from these common principles of diversification
and mobility, they suffered. The Great Plains Indians' heavy reliance on bison,
for example, made them vulnerable to climatic shifts and disease. 9' On the other
hand, some Native Americans were adept at recognizing flood-prone areas and
responding accordingly by elevating infrastructure to reduce flood risk.
92
The relationship between wildfire and hunter-gatherers, while not as central to
the development of humanity as droughts or floods, also fits into a model of
mobility, diversification, and ecological awareness. On the one hand, hunter-
gatherers developed resilience to unintentional wildfires by remaining mobile
instead of rooted to one particular location. They migrated away from drier
regions and toward wetter ones, where wildfires were less likely to occur. If
wildfires did befall them, nomads suffered few losses because their mobility
allowed them to quickly resettle in a fire-free location. On the other hand,
hunter-gatherers also proactively harnessed the benefits of low-intensity fires in
87. Id. at 136-37.
88. Id. at 140-41.
89. See id. at 137-38.
90. Lynn H. Gamble, Culture and Climate: Reconsidering the Effect of Palaeoclimatic Variability Among
Southern Californian Hunter-Gatherer Societies, 37 WORLD ARCHAEOLOGY 92, 98 (2005).
91. Elizabeth Colson, In Good Years and in Bad: Food Strategies of Self-Reliant Societies, 35 J.
ANTHROPOLOGICAL RESEARCH 18, 22 (1979).
92. TRISTRAM R. KIDDER, Making the City Inevitable: NativeAmericans and the Geography of New Orleans,
in TRANSFORMING NEW ORLEANS AND ITS ENVIRONS: CENTURIES OF CHANGE 9, 13 (Craig E. Colten ed., 2000).
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order to prevent high-intensity fires, clear dense forested areas, or draw out
game.93 In floodplains, for example, burning was utilized frequently to collect
small animals for food, while rapid growth of vegetation feeding on the now
nutrient rich soil would attract a diversity of species.94 In more arid regions like
California and Oregon, prescribed burns limited fuel buildup and, consequently,
high-intensity fires.9 5
B. THE RISE OF AGRICULTURE AND FIXED VULNERABILITIES
This mobile and adaptable hunter-gatherer approach to water variability and
wildfire remained successful for millions of years and, in limited cases, is still
practiced to this day.96 There are countless examples of hunter-gatherer adapta-
tion strategies to droughts, floods, and wildfire, though not all of them have been
successful. The most common mechanisms that persisted are variations on the
characteristics of early hominids that made human ancestors so successful in the
first place: diversification, mobility, and a fine-tuned awareness of the surround-
ing environment and local conditions. However, around 10,000 years ago, the
emergence of agriculture during the Neolithic Revolution transformed the human
species and the world. The ability to produce food in vast quantities allowed
humans to reproduce rapidly and allocate labor and resources to technological
development, resource accumulation, and community expansion. On the eve of
agriculture, humans numbered ten million;97 today there are over seven billion.98
While the transition was also fueled by droughts, floods, and wildfire, it was
specifically made possible by the relatively stable climates and water systems of
the Holocene. 99 Most of the regions in which agriculture originated in or rapidly
93. See Larry Mason, Listening and Learning from Traditional Knowledge and Western Science: A Dialogue
on Contemporary Challenges of Forest Health and Wildfire, 110 J. OF FORESTRY 187, 189 (2012) (documenting
knowledge exchange between North American tribal communities and non-tribal scientists and forest managers
with respect to fire management).
94. Henry T. Lewis, Hunter- Gatherers and Problems for Fire History, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRE HISTORY
WORKSHOP 115, 115 (U.S. Dep't of Agric., Forest Serv. ed., 1980), available at http://ir.library.oregonstate.edu/
xmlui/bitstream/handle/1957/9400/Pro Of The Fir His Wor Sho.pdf#page=121.
95. Id. at 118.
96. Unfortunately, however, many communities of hunter-gatherers were quickly and forcefully integrated
into agriculture-based civilizations, destroying our window into a lifestyle that spans millions of years of human
evolution. See, e.g., FNLAYSON, supra note 81, at 132-45 (discussing the Mardu people of Australia).
97. Bruce Winterhalder & Douglas J. Kennett, Behavioral Ecology and the Transition from Hunting and
Gathering to Agriculture, in BEHAVIORAL ECOLOGY AND THE TRANSITION TO AGRICULTURE 1 (Bruce Winterhalder
& Douglas J. Kennett eds., 2006).
98. U.S. World and Population Clock, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/popclock/ (last visited
Apr. 28, 2015). Population density can explain much of the population growth: there are typically 0.1
hunter-gatherers per square kilometer, while rice agriculturalists can sustain 1000 per kilometer. Winterhalder &
Kennett, supra note 97, at 1. The effects of population density on the environment are numerous and well
chronicled. See, e.g., D. PIMENTALET AL., Ecology of Increasing Diseases: Population Growth and Environmen-
tal Degradation, 35 HUM. ECOLOGY 653, 653 (2007).
99. FNLAYSON, supra note 81, at 150-5 1.
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spread to featured warm, arid river systems l°° or tropical highlands that offered
predictable precipitation sufficient to support large-scale crop production and
irrigation."10 There are a myriad of theoretical frameworks attempting to further
explain the transition to agriculture, 10 2 but the manner of transition is less
important here than the experiences of agricultural societies in times of drought,
flooding, and wildfire. Agricultural systems offer certain advantages, but resil-
ience to extreme natural events has not always been one of them. In fact, selected
adaptation failures from the past provide a glimpse of the vulnerabilities today.
By 1000 A.D., farming was practiced throughout the American Southwest,
including in what is now Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, Colorado, and Mexico. 103
Within this region, agricultural societies settled in forested uplands where rainfall
sustained annual crop production, particularly corn, the staple crop. 10 4 Eventu-
ally agricultural success led to population densities that likely met or exceeded
regional capacity. 10 5 Density on this scale had several consequences. Most
importantly, it precluded mobility, which led farmers to double-down on their
investments by building dams and terraces, 10 6 making relocation less appealing
and further limiting mobility. Density also put pressure on forested areas and
forced farmers to reduce the risk of wildfire. Before modern firefighting tech-
niques were developed the most reliable wildfire risk reduction strategy was
forest clearing, which had the added benefit of producing timber resources and
creating the potential for further agricultural expansion. Intense logging also led
to soil erosion and would have eliminated the option of complementing crop
production with foraging during low-yield periods. 17 These vulnerabilities were
tested between 1250 and 1450, when rainfall in upland areas deviated from
otherwise stable precipitation patterns observed throughout the second millen-
nium A.D.1 ° 8 The inability to relocate upstream, downstream, or to a different
upland elevation or river basin caused unprecedented regional collapse and
abandonment. 109
In earlier cases, failures to adapt to drought prompted collapse not only of
agricultural regions, but also of the agricultural system itself. For example, about
four thousand years ago in Anatolia, Egypt, Greece, Palestine, and Mesopotamia,
farmers responded to climate change-induced drought by abandoning sedentary
100. For example, the Tigris, Euphrates, Jordan, Yangtze, Yellow, Indus, Nile, Mississippi, Ohio, and Niger
Rivers. See id.
101. Id.; see also Winterhalder & Kennett, supra note 97, at 6.
102. See, e.g., Winterhalder & Kennett, supra note 97, at 4-10.
103. Linda Cordell, Aftermath of Chaos in the Pueblo Southwest, in ENVIRONMENTAL DISASTER AND THE
ARCHAEOLOGY OF HUMAN RESPONSE 179, 181-82 (Garth Bawden & Richard Martin Reycraft eds., 2000).
104. Id. at 181.
105. Id. at 182-83.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 183.
108. Id. at 185-86.
109. Other factors such as warfare and disease likely contributed. See id. at 189.
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agriculture altogether and transitioning to pastoral or nomadic lifestyles.
110
Modern economies of scale, however, both preclude nimble and dramatic
transitions to nomadic lifestyles and induce public reliance on a state-
administered, market-based agricultural system that places significant pressure
on the state to deliver during times of drought. For example, fifteenth century
droughts in India coincided with periods of unrest and revolt among agricultural
tenants and lower classes suffering from famine and increased food prices."'
This dynamic repeated itself during nineteenth century droughts in India, when
grain prices skyrocketed in the face of speculation, and many landless laborers
abandoned their homes, became reliant on charity, or died. 112 Unusually, fields
that relied on complex reservoir irrigation schemes during this period were worse
off than rain-fed fields because drought conditions were not considered when the
irrigation systems were developed.'
1 13
In arid regions, floodplains are often the only water source available for
irrigating cropland, and are often desirable locations for residential development
due to their proximity to drinking water. Unfortunately, floodplain development
makes societies highly susceptible to extreme floods. This was the case in
Southern Peru around 1350 A.D., when an unexpected El Nino event devastated
the Chirabaya people, washing away their homes and farmland.'1 14 The Chirabaya
had moved into and developed the Ilo Valley, irrigating farmland with a river-fed
canal and settling large villages at the base of the valley walls.'1 15 However, their
flood-control measures were inadequate, and floods easily breached the irrigation
canal. 1 16 Furthermore, political leaders were unable to muster post-disaster
support from neighboring areas, forcing the collapse and eventual abandonment
of the valley.1 17 In South Arabia, Iron Age societies were faced not with a single
flooding catastrophe but with repeated flooding events that wreaked havoc on
city-states that predominantly relied on exploiting forest resources to produce
incense.118 Pastoralists that retained more tribal, mobile communities, on the
other hand, were more resilient and still exist to this day.119
110. Harvey Weiss, Beyond the Younger Dryas: Collapse as Adaptation to Abrupt Climate Change in
Ancient West Asia and the Eastern Mediterranean, in ENVIRONMENTAL DISASTER AND THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF
HUMAN RESPONSE, supra note 103, at 75, 91.
111. Kathleen D. Morrison, Naturalizing Disaster: From Drought to Famine in Southern India, in
ENVIRONMENTAL DISASTER AND THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF HUMAN RESPONSE, supra note 103, at 21, 29-30.
112. Id. at 24-25.
113. Id. at 23.
114. Richard Martin Reycraft, Long-Term Human Response to El Nifo in South Coastal Peru, Circa A.D.
1400, in ENVIRONMENTAL DISASTER AND THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF HUMAN RESPONSE, supra note 103, at 99.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 104, 118.
117. Id. at 116.
118. Juris Zarins, Environmental Disruption and Human Response: An Archaeological-Historical Example
from South Arabia, in ENVIRONMENTAL DISASTER AND THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF HUMAN RESPONSE, supra note 103,
at 35, 46.
119. Id.
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In other cases, droughts, floods, and wildfires were not the primary culprits
behind societal collapse, but unwise approaches to these natural events acceler-
ated the downfall. The collapse of the Maya, for example, was likely a product of
warfare and intense internal competition, but a heavy reliance on corn carried a
high degree of risk that could not buttress against the political instability. 
120
Sophisticated water management infrastructure and techniques that preserved
flows in times of drought, while protecting communities from floods, were able to
support the corn reliance and sustain the community in years of relative peace. 
121
A risky water management strategy, however, could not withstand the pressures
of political discord. 122 Similarly, while the Moche people of Peru experienced
climatic fluctuations that imposed extreme droughts and floods on urban popula-
tions, political fragmentation was a complementary element of civilizational
decline. 123 In Greece, poor forest management practices correlated with sharp
agricultural and population declines. Instead of conserving forests or practicing
limited prescribed burns to reduce wildfire risks, Bronze Age populations cleared
entire forests, destabilizing topsoil, and increasing sedimentation in rivers. 124
Rivers became choked, and populations were forced to relocate or abandon the
region altogether. 125
C. HISTORIC MODELS OF RESILIENCE
The transition to agriculture took place between eight thousand and thirteen
thousand years ago. 126 Prior to this, hunter-gatherers survived for hundreds of
thousands of years. Not all hunter-gatherer societies were resilient to droughts,
floods, and wildfires, and not all agricultural societies were highly vulnerable.
However, it is likely that the decline of the hunter-gatherer was more a product of
relative, rather than internal, weaknesses. In other words, hunter-gatherers were
marginalized because agriculture-supported societies subsumed them, not be-
cause the hunter-gatherer lifestyle was no longer feasible. 127 That, combined with
the sheer longevity of the hunter-gatherer approach, suggests that the ways in
120. Claude Chapdelaine, Struggling for Survival: The Urban Class of the Moche Site, North Coast of Peru,
in ENVIRONMENTAL DISASTER AND THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF HUMAN RESPONSE, supra note 103, at 121, 125.
121. Vernon L. Scarborough, Resilience, Resource Use, and Socioeconomic Organization: A Mesoamerican
Pathway, in ENVIRONMENTAL DISASTER AND THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF HUMAN RESPONSE, supra note 103, at 195,
200-02.
122. See Weiss, supra note 110, at 91 (exploring similarly untenable strains on both political cooperation and
water resources management in West Asia and the Mediterranean).
123. Chapdelaine, supra note 120, at 139.
124. Curtis Runnels, Anthropogenic Soil Erosion in Prehistoric Greece: The Contribution of Regional
Surveys to the Archaeology of Environmental Disruptions, in ENVIRONMENTAL DISASTER AND THE ARCHAEOLOGY
OF HUMAN RESPONSE, supra note 103, at 11, 18.
125. Id. at 14.
126. Winterhalder & Kennett, supra note 97, at 1.
127. See id. at 3.
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which hunter-gatherers survived droughts, floods, and wildfires may provide
relevant insights today. Similarly, the largely unsustainable nature of modern
agriculture and human consumption make the agricultural failures of the past
worth learning from. By contrasting paleo approaches to droughts, floods, and
wildfires, we can construct a model for resiliency that can be up-scaled to the
present.
Hunter-gatherers exhibit three fundamental characteristics that enable commu-
nities to withstand droughts, floods, and wildfires: mobility, diversified policy
portfolios, and awareness of the surrounding environment. Mobility allows
populations to react to environmental conditions by relocating away from
unfavorable locations, or towards favorable locations, at low cost. Diversification
of policy options, in turn, ensures that when changes in the environment apply
pressure to one source of societal stability, other sources can be relied upon to
maintain continuity. Awareness of the surrounding environment, finally, enables
mobility and diversification by providing the information needed to recognize
challenges and opportunities. In hunter-gatherer societies, awareness was often
coupled with effective integration of information into decision-making processes.
Ancient agricultural societies, conversely, failed because they were immobile,
overly reliant on a limited number of coping mechanisms, and insensitive to
changes in the surrounding environment. Where population density precluded
relocation of farmlands, societies were highly vulnerable to droughts, floods, and
wildfires. Immobility had the added effect of promoting investments in sedentary
infrastructure, increasing the cost of relocation. Reliance on one resilience
strategy, such as a single crop, made agriculturalists even more vulnerable
because it eliminated sources of, and the skills needed to exploit, alternative food
sources. Finally, awareness of the surrounding environment was minimized
because agriculture created a system wherein resources are obtained wholly
outside of a wilderness context. Forest clearing and development in floodplains
or desert regions may be necessary in limited circumstances, but excessive use
demonstrates a lack of foresight. Unfortunately, all three characteristics can be
seen in U.S. drought, flood, and wildfire laws and policies.
III. DROUGHT, FLOOD, AND WILDFIRE LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES: PRODUCTS
OF THE NEOLITHIC REVOLUTION
Because droughts, floods, and wildfires impact agricultural, rural, and urban
land use schemes in the United States, the laws that address these natural events
are necessarily broader in scope than their names would suggest, encompassing a
variety of substantive legal frameworks 128 and implicating federal, state, and
administrative jurisdictions. Across this complex web of laws, however, the
128. For example, agriculture law, water law, energy law, real estate and land-use law, and public lands
management.
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characteristics of vulnerable and unsustainable agriculture-based societies de-
scribed above-immobility, lack of diversification, and insensitivity to the
surrounding environment-are manifested in disquieting ways. Each legal sys-
tem is examined for these indicia of vulnerability.
A. DROUGHT LAW
Drought is, admittedly, an immensely complex challenge for a legal frame-
work to address. First, a consensus definition of what constitutes a drought is
elusive. In Section I, the historical record of drought was primarily conceptual-
ized in meteorological terms; that is, drought is a sustained reduction in baseline
precipitation conditions across time. 129 Many temporal studies and government
agency programs rely on the Palmer Drought Severity Index, which calculates
mostly meteorological data. 130 A common alternative definition perceives drought
in terms of supply and demand; more specifically, a drought occurs when demand
for water, whether human or environmental, exceeds supply. 131 These more
operational definitions include hydrological drought, marked by a deficiency of
ground and surface water resources measured against the needs of a water
management system; agricultural drought, characterized by a lack of soil
moisture and consequent crop failure; and socioeconomic drought, which occurs
when demand for water outstrips the current supply. 
132
Second, even if a common definition can be agreed upon to guide policy,
threshold determinations must account for regional variations because one region
of the United States may expect-and consequently demand-more or less water
availability than another. 133 As seen in Section II, a historical analysis may also
provide definitional perspective. According to the historical record, twenty-first
century droughts are not unusual and reflect a normalized distribution of water
availability. 134 Reconciling these various definitional nuances produces complex
and, at times, arbitrary drought determinations. The U.S. Drought Monitor, for
example, provides drought maps relied upon by the U.S. Department of Agricul-
ture, Internal Revenue Service, and various other agencies. 135 It self-identifies as
129. See Adler, supra note 19; Wilhite & Glantz, supra note 19, at 113.
130. Comparison of Major Drought Indices: Palmer Drought Severity Index, NAT'L DROUGHT MITIGATION
CTR., http://drought.unl.edu/Planning/Monitoring/ComparisonoflndicesIntro/PDSI.aspx (last visited Apr. 28,
2015). But see William M. Alley, The Palmer Drought Severity Index: Limitations and Assumptions, 23
J. APPLIED METEOROLOGY & CLIMATOLOGY 1100 (1984) (reviewing aspects of drought dynamics not considered
by the Palmer Drought Severity Index).
131. See, e.g., Kelly T. Redmond, The Depiction ofDrought, A Commentary, 83 BULL. AM. METEOROLOGICAL SOC'Y
1143,1144 (2002).
132. Ashok K. Mishra & Vijay P. Singh, A Review of Drought Concepts, 391 J. HYDROLOGY 202, 206 (2010).
133. Adler, supra note 19, at 210-11.
134. See, e.g., Woodhouse & Overpeck, supra note 29, at 2693-98.
135. U.S. Drought Monitor Background, NAT'L DROUGHT MITIGATION CTR., http://droughtmonitor.unl.edu/
AboutUSDM/Background.aspx (last visited Apr. 28, 2015).
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a "blend of science and subjectivity," incorporating climatic, hydrologic, and soil
data, impact assessments, and expert opinion. 136 As of August 12, 2014, the
Drought Monitor depicted much of the American West and Southwest in a state
of drought. 
137
The apparent public apathy that tends to occur before, during, and following a
drought poses an additional challenge toward the development and implementa-
tion of serious drought management measures. Because the onset and effects of
drought are gradual, the need for action is not recognized until impacts are
acute, 13 at which point responses are necessarily reactive and not proactive. 139
The eventual transition back to wetter, less water-stressed conditions is accompa-
nied by a psychological transition back to business as usual and a collective
forgetting of the drought problem. 140 A 1989 Minnesota Department of Natural
Resources report analyzing the previous summer's drought observed similar
impacts in the 1930s Dust Bowl, prompting the authors to ask: "Have we not
learned how to control wind and water erosion in the last fifty years? Or are
attitudes regarding land and water stewardship really unchanged during this
period?" 1
4 1
Finally, drought law is a challenging undertaking because it encompasses
an uncoordinated set of federal and state agricultural laws, water resources
laws, and disaster management policies. These laws are distributed across
state and federal jurisdictions and time periods, making it difficult to
articulate-much less coordinate and implement-a coherent drought law
framework. The sheer number of institutional actors involved across time and
space make enacting laws and policies with common goals or approaches in
mind unlikely. In fact, the various legal doctrines involving drought manage-
ment are often working against drought mitigation and adaptation. Doctrines
of water allocation largely promote economically productive uses of water,
with little concern for conservation or future scarcity. 142 Agricultural policies,
by and large, are designed to maximize yields and stabilize food production.
143
136. Id.
137. Anthony Artusa, U.S. Drought Monitor CONUS, NAT'L DROUGHT MITIGATION CTR. (Aug. 19, 2014,
8:00 AM), http://droughtmonitor.unl.eduMapsAndData/MapArchive.aspx.
138. Redmond, supra note 131, at 1144.
139. Adler, supra note 19, at 208.
140. JOHN STEINBECK, NOVELS 1942-1952 312 (2001) (noting this phenomenon in East of Eden: "And it
never failed that during the dry years people forgot about the rich years, and during the wet years they lost all
memory of the dry years. It was always that way."); see also Adler, supra note 19, at 208-09.
141. MINN. DEP'T NAT. REs. DROUGHT OF 1988 1, 41 (Jan. 1989), available at http://climate.umn.edu/pdf/
drought88.pdf.
142. See Adler, supra note 19, at 209.
143. See Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 601-627 (West 1933) (invalidated by United
States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936)); see Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1281-1407 (1938).
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Even drought management plans, couched in terms of disaster relief, do little
to reduce vulnerability to future droughts. 144
State common law doctrines primarily determine water allocation in the
United States. States east of the Mississippi River follow riparian law, which
grants "reasonable use" rights to riparian landowners. 145 Under this system, any
riparian landowner may make a reasonable use of water at any time, so long as
the water remains on the parcel abutting the water source. 14 6 Perhaps inadver-
tently, the territorial dimension of riparianism is an elegant water conservation
strategy because it precludes costly and inefficient large-scale water transfers to
distant lands. 147 The downside, however, of riparianism is that riparian lands may
not be the most logical water destination. 148 For example, many riparian lands are
located in floodplains where increased development comes with an increased risk
of flood damage. The reasonable use standard may also be problematic in times
of drought; a particular use may be reasonable for the individual riparian
landowner but not economically productive in the aggregate. 149 In these cases,
courts have traditionally adjudicated water rights, but fact-specific litigation is
tedious, has little precedential value, and is devoid of a larger, comprehensive
drought strategy. 
150
For the reasons stated above, most eastern states now practice a model of
regulated riparianism, in which an administrative agency issues permits based
loosely on riparian concepts and on case-by-case considerations. In Florida, for
example, well-funded water management districts issue permits to users as long
as minimum flow requirements are met to maintain ecological integrity. 151 In
theory, administrative agencies could develop region-specific drought mitigation
and adaptation strategies; too often, though, they struggle to incentivize conserva-
tion. 152 Considering the difficulty inherent in determining which water uses take
priority during drought in the absence of a coherent drought policy, it is not a
144. See generally Drought Planning Resources, By State, NAT'L DROUGHT MITIGATION CTR., http:II
drought.unl.edu/Planning/PlanninglnfobyState.aspx (last visited Apr. 28, 2015); DROUGHT PREPAREDNESS
COUNCIL, STATE OF TEXAS DROUGHT PREPAREDNESS PLAN 4 (2005), available at http://seca.unl.edu/web-archive/
StateDroughtPlans/DroughtPlans/TX_2005.pdf; NAT. RES. AGENCY, CAL. DEP'T WATER RES., CALIFORNIA
DROUGHT CONTINGENCY PLAN 7 (2010), available at http://seca.unl.edu/web archive/StateDroughtPlans/
DroughtPlans/CA_2010.pdf.
145. BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR. ETAL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES: CASES AND MATERIALS 28 (5th
ed. 2013).
146. Id. at 29.
147. Id. at 30.
148. See, e.g., id. at 31.
149. Robert W. Adler, Climate Change and the Hegemony of State Water Law, 29 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 19
(2010).
150. Id.
151. FLA. STAT § 373.0421 (2010).
152. See, e.g., Ryan B. Stoa, Florida Water Management Districts and the Florida Water Resources Act: The
Challenges of Basin-Level Management, 7 Ky. J. EQUINE AGRIC. & NAT. RES. L. 1, 73 (2014); Adler, supra note
19, at 224.
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remarkable improvement that decisions are now in the hands of bureaucrats
instead of judges. 153
States west of the Mississippi River-historically a more arid region-follow
the doctrine of prior appropriation, in which water rights are disconnected from land
ownership and are obtained based on the order in which water users make beneficial
use of the resource.154 This system provides freedom to transport water to wherever it
might be needed, but precludes drought-induced reductions across the board. In times
of drought or water scarcity, senior appropriators retain priority regardless of how they
use their water and have little incentive to reduce their consumption. Furthermore,
because water rights are transferrable, they are subject to market forces that may not be
conducive to optimum-or even rational-conservation strategies in times of drought. 
155
For example, many bottled-water companies source their water from drought-ridden
states. 156 California, which is in a state of exceptional drought, produces ninety-five
percent of U.S. broccoli and ninety-nine percent U.S. walnuts, water-intensive crops
that require around five gallons of water to produce one head of broccoli or walnut. 1
57
Similarly, more than half of hydraulic fracturing wells-which employ a water-
intensive process of shale oil development-are located in areas experiencing drought. 158
Curiously, a third doctrine of water law governs groundwater, despite the fact
that groundwater systems are usually connected to surface waters and are
therefore part of the same hydrological system. Groundwater laws have tradition-
ally developed more slowly than surface water laws. 15 9 This is unfortunate
considering the increasing use of groundwater, 160 the immense potential of
groundwater reserves in times of drought, 16' and the sobering fact that groundwa-
ter reserves take much longer to replenish, if they do so at all. 162 In general, there
are five doctrines governing groundwater, with variations on one of three
153. Adler, supra note 149, at 20.
154. THOMPSON, JR. ETAL., supra note 145, at 169-71.
155. Adler, supra note 19, at 226.
156. Julia Lurie, Bottled Water Comes from the Most Drought-Ridden Places in the Country, MOTHER JONES
(Aug. 11, 2014, 6:00 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/environment/2014/08/bottled-water-california-
drought.
157. Alex Park & Julia Lurie, It Takes How Much Water to Grow an Almond?!, MOTHER JONES (Feb. 24,
2014, 6:55 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/environment/2014/02/wheres-californias-water-going.
158. MONiKA FREYMAN, HYDRAULIC FRACTURING & WATER STRESS: WATER DEMAND BY THE NUMBERS 6
(2014).
159. THOMPSON, JR. ETAL., supra note 145, at 444-46.
160. Groundwater Use in the United States, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, http://water.usgs.gov/edu/wugw.html
(last updated Mar. 17, 2014, 11:04 AM).
161. Approximately ninety percent of U.S. freshwater supplies are located underground. Groundwater
Facts, NAT'L GROUNDWATER ASS'N, http://www.ngwa.org/fundamentals/use/pages/groundwater-facts.aspx (last
updated Oct. 18, 2010).
162. See generally Yoshihide Wada et al., Global Depletion of Groundwater Resources, in GEOPHYSICAL
RESEARCH LETTERS 1 (2010); P.B. McMahon et al., A Comparison of Recharge Rates in Aquifers of the United
States Based on Groundwater-age Data, 19 HYDROGEOLOGY J. 779 (2011), available at http://co.water.usgs.gov/
publications/non-usgsfMcMahon2011 _Hydrogeo.pdf.
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paradigms: first, the rule of capture, in which anyone may extract as much
groundwater as needed without limit; second, reasonable use, in which overlying
landowners may use groundwater as long as that use is reasonable and/or
equitable; and third, prior appropriation, in which groundwater rights attach on a
first-in-time, first-in-right basis and endure by making continuous beneficial use
of the water. 163 Doctrines based on reasonable use and prior appropriation mirror
the drought deficiencies explained above. The rule of capture, however, adds a
wrinkle with devastating consequences for drought resilience because it incentiv-
izes using as much groundwater as possible. Farmers in these capture-governed
areas find themselves in a race to drill deeper and deeper in search of diminishing
supplies. 164 Rapid declines in the groundwater table can cause land subsidence,
damaging crops, irrigation canals, and urban infrastructure. For example, in the
Central Valley of California a 1,200 square mile area has been sinking by almost
a foot per year. 165 Groundwater extraction rates are so high that global sea level
rise can partially be explained by groundwater runoff from the United States. 166
In spite of the drought-insensitive nature of their water allocation systems,
states have adopted targeted drought laws. Forty-seven states have developed, or
are developing, drought management plans; however, thirty-two of these are
reactive in nature and do little to reduce future vulnerability. 167 Even plans
focused on mitigation pay inordinate attention to process, such as coordination
and governing authority that, while important, do little to address larger structural
problems such as land use and water rights. 168 Many plans, regardless of
approach, channel funding towards drought relief. While providing financial aid
to drought victims shows compassion, it does little to modify the behavior
patterns that created the vulnerability to drought damage in the first place. 169 On
the contrary, financial compensation to redress drought damage incentivizes a
business-as-usual approach.
While states have traditionally dictated the development of water law, the
federal government plays a large role by funding large water infrastructure
projects such as dams, dikes, and canals that harness water systems for human
163. THOMPSON, JR. ET AL., supra note 145, at 447.
164. See, e.g., Lisa M. Krieger, California Drought: San Joaquin Valley Sinking as Farmers Race to Tap
Aquifer, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (June 10, 2014, 1:28 PM), http://www.mercurynews.com/drought/
ci_25447586/california-drought-san-joaquin-valley-sinking-farmers-race.
165. Tom Philpott, California Farmers: Drill, Baby, Drill (for Water That Is), MOTHER JONES (Apr. 2, 2014,
6:00 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/tom-philpott/2014/04/california-drought-groundwater-drilling.
166. U.S. DEP'T INTERIOR, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, GROUNDWATER DEPLETION IN THE UNITED STATES
(1900-2008) 50-51 (2013), available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/sir/2013/5079/SIR2013-5079.pdf.
167. See generally Drought Planning Resources, by State, supra note 144.
168. See e.g., Drought Planning Resources, supra note 144; DROUGHT PREPAREDNESS COUNCIL, supra note
144; NAT. RES. AGENCY, supra note 144.
169. Adler, supra note 19, at 231.
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benefit. 170 Reservoirs promote drought resilience by storing surface water flows,
and irrigation systems can dramatically increase agricultural productivity. 171 But
large-scale infrastructure projects may also promote population growth or agricul-
tural development in areas where water is scarce. 17 2 Even where water is
relatively abundant, federal water projects can shape growth trajectories for a
region, with major drought implications. The Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint
("ACF") River Basin, for example, is shared by Georgia, Alabama, and Florida-
states with relative water abundance. In 1989, however, the Army Corps of
Engineers agreed to expand the storage of Lake Lanier and other reservoirs in
order to satisfy the water demands of Atlanta's burgeoning population. 173 While
the decision enabled the city to continue on its growth trajectory, downstream
users in Alabama and Florida suffered, embroiling the states and federal govern-
ment in litigation for decades. 174 The conflict was especially tense for all parties
when drought conditions made scarce water resources even scarcer. 175
Because agriculture accounts for nearly ninety percent of water consumption
in the United States, 176 it stands to reason that federal agricultural policy and
drought disaster assistance play a major role in U.S. approaches toward drought.
Until the Dust Bowl of the 1930s ravaged farming communities, the federal
government's role in agriculture was minimal; if drought caused farmland to
become unusable, farmers were forced to relocate without any type of federal
assistance. 177 The Dust Bowl marked a turning point as the public recognized the
vital role that agriculture played in providing food for the nation. New Deal
policies created agricultural programs to minimize risk for farmers, for example
through subsidized feed, subsidized crop insurance, and financial aid grants. 
178
170. See Melanie Gall et al., The Unsustainable Trend of Natural Hazard Losses in the United States, 31
SUSTAINABILITY 2157, 2163 (2011); A. Dan Tarlock, United States Flood Control Policy: The Incomplete
Transition from the Illusion of Total Protection to Risk Management, 23 DUKE ENVTL. L. & PoL'Y E 151, 159
(2012).
171. Irrigation, ENVTL. PROF. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/agriculture/agl01/cropirrigation.html (last up-
dated June 27, 2012) (noting that "Irrigation makes agriculture possible in areas previously unsuitable for
intensive crop production").
172. Adler, supra note 19, at 235 (citing RICHARD W. WAHL, MARKETS FOR FEDERAL WATER: SUBSIDIES,
PROPERTY RIGHTS, AND THE BUREAU OF RECLAMATION (1989). But see Mark Kanazawa, Pricing Subsidies and
Economic Efficiency: The U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 36 J.L. & ECON. 205, 229 (1993) (finding that
agricultural water use may not be as responsive to water cost subsidies as previously suggested).
173. NICOLE T. CARTER ET AL., APALACHICOLA-CATTAHOOCHEE-FLINT (ACF) DROUGHT: FEDERAL WATER
MANAGEMENT ISSUES 5 (2008), available at http://www.dep.state.fl.us/mainpage/acf/files/crs-
reportcongress030508.pdf.
174. Id. at 23.
175. Id. at 6-8; see also Lewis Jones et al., Updating Twentieth Century Water Projects to Meet Twenty-First
Century Needs: Lessons from the Tri-State Water Wars, 29 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 959, 970 (2013).
176. How Important Is Irrigation to U.S. Agriculture, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., EcON. RESEARCH SER., http://www.ers.
usda.gov/topics/farm-practices-management/irrigation-water-use/background.aspx#.U-KimmldWmg (last updated June
7,2013).
177. Adler, supra note 19, at 245.
178. Id. at 247.
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The federal government also intervened in commodity markets to stabilize
supply and demand. Successive Agricultural Adjustment Acts 17 9 provided grants
that incentivized agricultural development in arid regions with the knowledge
that government-backed insurance programs would spread the risk across soci-
ety. 180 These policies were not just meant to protect farmers-they were designed
to prop up entire farming communities.18 1 Post-World War II policies created
general disaster relief funding frameworks through which governors can request,
and the President can grant, disaster assistance. 18 2 In the 1970s, the federal
government encouraged large-scale consolidation of small farms into large
agribusinesses, while maintaining subsidies, in order to dramatically increase
yields and promote agricultural exports. 183 Needless to say, maximizing short-
term yields is at odds with sustainable water or soil consumption.
For the most part, the pillars of agricultural law and policy that were set in
motion in the twentieth century-crop subsidies, government-backed insurance,
and direct relief payments-are still in place today. The Agricultural Act of
2014,184 which established agricultural spending for the following ten years,
allocates $44.4 billion for commodity programs and $90 billion for crop insur-
ance. 185 Disaster relief funds were distributed a week after the Act was signed
into law, including $100 million for livestock losses in California. 18 6 These three
pillars of federal agricultural policy seem likely to remain in place for the
foreseeable future; public attitudes regarding approaches to drought are receptive
to most adaptation proposals, but they are least supportive of agricultural
reforms. 18 7
B. FLOOD LAW
An interesting aspect of flood policy in the United States is that while the
federal government foots the bill for large flood control projects, insurance
179. See Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 601-627 (West 1933) (invalidated by U.S. v.
Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936)); see Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1281-1407 (1938).
180. Adler, supra note 19, at 250.
181. Id. at 253.
182. See, e.g., Federal Disaster Relief Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-875, 64 Stat. 1109 (1950) (current version
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121 etseq. (1995)).
183. Adler, supra note 19, at 259-60.
184. Agricultural Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-79 128 Stat. 649 (2014).
185. Brad Plumer, The $956 Billion Farm Bill, in One Graph, WASH. POST BLOG (Jan. 28, 2014),
http://www, washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/201 4/01 /28/the-950-billion-farm-bill-in-one-charU .
186. Obama Administration Announces Additional Assistance to Californians Impacted by Drought, U.S.
DEP'T OF AGRIC. (Feb. 14, 2014), http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/usdahome?contenidonly=true&contenid=
2014/02/0022.xml.
187. James W. Stoutenborough & Arnold Vedlitz, Public Attitudes Toward Water Management and Drought
in the United States, 28 WATER RES. MGMT. 697, 707 (2014) (noting that "agriculture is the last place the public
wants to look for water supply savings.").
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schemes, and disaster relief,188 decisions pertaining to city planning and manage-
ment-and therefore significant flood mitigation potential-are left to local
mayors, zoning boards, county commissions, and planning departments. 189 For
that reason, flood management approaches and vulnerabilities vary from one
locality to another, creating a piecemeal web of local regulations and federal
infrastructure projects. Because most counties contain lakes, rivers, streams, or a
coastline presenting flood hazards, this dynamic puts at least forty percent of the
U.S. population at risk,190 as nearly eighteen million people live in the highest
risk flood hazard areas.1 91 Consequently, floods are a greater threat and create
more economic damage than any other natural event. 192 It is very difficult to
quantify the direct and indirect costs of flooding, 193 which often reach tens of
billions of dollars annually, 194 and which are increasing. 
195
This increase in flood damage is a troubling trend, especially when accounting
for changes in wealth and population. 196 One possible explanation is that floods
are becoming more frequent, or more severe in magnitude or extent. Some
databases show an increase in the number of floods reported in the last several
decades, 197 though this could be due to an improvement in flood monitoring and
would not necessarily account for factors such as the influence of human
engineering and land use on flood incidence. Studies of flood trends throughout
American history, explored in Section I, do not conclusively show a trend.198 The
other possibility, then, is that increases in the cost of flood damages are a product
of societal vulnerability; that is, adaptation to floods is deteriorating. Whether
that hypothesis is true or not, it is clear that U.S. flood law and policy have not
been a model for disaster resilience.
188. ASS'N OF STATE FLOODPLAIN MANAGERS, FLOOD MAPPING FOR THE NATION: A COST ANALYSIS FOR THE
NATION'S FLOOD MAP INVENTORY 4 (Mar. 1, 2013), available at http://www.floods.org/ace-files/documentlibrary/
2012 NFIP Reform/FloodMapping for the NationASFPMReport_3-1-2013.pdf (noting the increase in
federal aid as a percentage of all economic costs of hurricanes).
189. SAMUEL D. BRODY ETAL., RISING WATERS: THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF FLOODING IN THE UNITED
STATES 3 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2011).
190. Implementation ofthe Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012: One Year after Enactment:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Econ. Pol'y of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & UrbanAffairs, 113th Cong.
48 (2013) (statement of Craig Fugate, Adm'r, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY).
191. Id. (noting that 5.6% of the U.S. population lives in the highest-risk flood-hazard areas).
192. BRODYETAL., supra note 189, at 11.
193. The National Weather Service's flood damage data, for example, exclude tidal, or coastal, flood damage
from their estimates. See Hydrologic Information Center Flood Loss Data, NAT'L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC
ADMIN., http://www.nws.noaa.gov/hic/ (last visited Apr. 28, 2014) (noting that damages often go underreported).
194. Id.
195. Gall et al., supra note 170, at 2175. See generally Hydrologic Information Center Flood Loss Data,
supra note 193.
196. See Gall et al., supra note 170, at 2177 (showing an increase in flood damages even after wealth and
population are normalized).
197. See, e.g., BRODY ET AL., supra note 189, at 11 (noting that floods increased from an annual average of
394 in the 1960s to 2,444 in the 1990s).
198. See, e.g., Hartmann et al., supra note 59; see also Peterson et al., supra note 15, at 826 fig. 3.
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Prior to the federal government's engagement in flood issues, adaptation
measures were predominantly left to local governments, which addressed them
on a case-by-case basis. That meant allowing rivers to run their courses and
accepting the risk of floodplain development in cases where floods could be
attributed to natural causes. Flood relief, importantly, was not-and is not-
foreclosed by the absence of federal policies. Common law tort remedies, for
example, sometimes allow victims to recover damages due to flooding. Landown-
ers who use their properties in such a way as to cause flood damage to another are
subject to nuisance claims,1 99 and trespass actions have been successful in cases
where induced floods constituted an invasion of property. 20 0 Negligence can be
assigned for flood control measures that fail to meet an appropriate standard of
care. 20 1 Finally, doctrines of water law have been instrumental in dictating
small-scale flood control policies. Installations that protect one riparian property
from water incursion but increase the risk for downstream riparian lands is a
classic inquiry into what constitutes "reasonable use. 20 2 And even if flood
control measures like dams, fill, or gabions are successful in a prior appropriation
state, they would not be permissible if streamflows are altered such that a
downstream senior appropriator's water rights are impaired.20 3 Takings claims,
alleging that flood protection regulations unconstitutionally diminish property
values without just compensation, are discussed in Section IV.
Reliance on local efforts and common law principles, however, did not provide
the type of flood protection framework that satisfied progressive managers.20 4
Widespread levee installation became the civil engineering project du jour, but
coordination and maintenance was difficult considering the magnitude of the
challenge.20 5 The legacy of this period is evidenced by over 100,000 miles of
levees still in place today.206 Perhaps because eighty-five percent of levees are
locally owned and operated, many are in a state of disrepair;207 full rehabilitation
might cost more than $100 billion.20 8
199. Edward A. Thomas & Sam Riley Medlock, Mitigating Misery: Land Use and Protection of Property
Rights Before the next Big Flood, 9 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 155, 164, n. 58 (2008) (citing Sandifer Motors, Inc. v. City
of Roeland Park, 628 P.2d 239, 242-44 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981)).
200. Id. at 164, n. 61 (citing Musumeci v. State, 43 A.D.2d 288, 291 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974)).
201. Id. at 165, n. 63 (citing Kunz v. Utah Power & Light Co., 526 F.2d 500, 504 (9th Cir. 1975)).
202. See THOMPSON JR. ET AL., supra note 145, at 34 (explaining factors relevant to a reasonableness
determination).
203. See id. at 169-71.
204. See Purdy, supra note 80 (detailing the rise in ambitious environmental engineering approaches).
205. See Tarlock, supra note 170, at 158.
206. AM. SocY OF Civ. ENG'RS, 2013 REPORT CARD FOR AMERICA'S INFRASTRUCTURE: LEVEES 1 (2013),
http://www.infrastructurereportcard.org/a/documentsLevees.pdf.
207. Id. at 2. In 2013, the American Society of Civil Engineers gave the United States a grade of D- for its
poor levee infrastructure. Id. at 1.
208. Id. at 3.
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Just as the Dust Bowl of the 1930s prompted federal intervention in agricul-
tural policy, the Mississippi Flood of 1927 necessitated a federal role in flood
policy. The Flood Control Act of 1928209 assigned flood control to the Army
Corps of Engineers, which remains the agency responsible for building infrastruc-
ture to protect floodplain communities and investments. 210 The mechanism to
accomplish this task was a system of structural defense measures such as dams,
levees, and upstream reservoirs, taking into account a river basin's entire
hydrogeographical area. 2 11 Large reservoirs, of course, have tremendous ecologi-
cal impacts 212 as they create lakes or widen rivers over lands that were previously
dry, thus displacing or drowning plant and animal species. The temptation to hold
back floodwaters was nevertheless too great for social or environmental concerns
to overcome, and therefore reservoir dam building continued through the 1960s.2 13
Importantly, however, Congressional preference for a project-based water plan-
ning approach caused the principle of basin-wide management to fall by the
wayside.214 Instead, large water projects are conducted on an ad hoc basis, and
the Corps of Engineers has not developed an integrated basin management
mindset.2 15 When water projects are undertaken on this scale without a measured
evaluation of the effects that hydrological installations have on the basin and its
water users, the likelihood of conflict increases. The ongoing ACF River Basin
conflict, for example, was sparked by the Army Corps of Engineers' decision to
expand the storage capacity of Lake Lanier, denying downstream communities in
Alabama and Florida their expected floWS.
2 16
Flood control projects have been generally effective at retaining water flows,
but several drawbacks emerge when infrastructure forms the basis of flood
policy. First, there are ongoing maintenance and operational costs. The average
age of dams in the United States is fifty-two years; the cost to repair them is
estimated at $57 billion.217 Most are under the inspection authority of state
regulatory programs that are woefully underfunded 218 or, as in Alabama's case,
209. Flood Control Act of 1928, 33 U.S.C. §§ 702a-702m, 704 (2013).
210. Tarlock, supra note 170, at 159.
211. See id. at 160.
212. See generally R.M. Baxter, Environmental Effects of Dams and Impoundments, 8 ANN. REV. ECOLOGY
& SYSTEMATICS 255 (1977).
213. See Tarlock, supra note 170, at 163-64.
214. See id. at 164.
215. See id. (citing the National Water Commission's critical assessment of the Corps of Engineers' water
management capacities).
216. See Adler, supra note 19, at 231.
217. AM. SocY OF Civ. ENG'RS, 2013 REPORT CARD FOR AMERICA'S INFRASTRUCTURE: DAMS 1, 3 (2013),
http://www.infrastructurereportcard.org/a/documents/Dams.pdf [hereinafter 2013 REPORT CARD]; Levees: Invest-
ment & Funding, AM. SoC'Y Civ. ENG'RS, http://www.infrastructurereportcard.org/a/#p/levees/investment-and-
funding (last visited Apr. 28, 2015).
218. See State Dam Safety Budgets, AM. SOCY OF Civ. ENG'RS, http://www.infrastructurereportcard.org/a/#e/
dam-safety-budgets (last visited Apr. 28, 2015).
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219
non-existent. Second, infrastructure fails, and does so with potentially devas-
tating results. Of 14,000 dams in the United States that would cause a loss of life
upon failure, 2,000 are in a deficient condition.220 From 2005 to 2013, dams
failed 173 times. 221 A 2008 dam failure in Nevada that flooded 600 homes and
stranded 3,500 people, for example, was the result of poor construction and
maintenance.222 Levee failures likewise contributed to the devastation caused by
Hurricane Katrina,223 which resulted in 1,200 deaths and $200 billion in
damage.224 Third, infrastructure provides a false sense of security, promoting
development in floodplains that would not occur without protective infrastruc-
ture, consequently increasing flood damage when infrastructure fails. This moral
hazard was identified during the heyday of dam construction,225 but was largely
ignored in favor of floodplain development.
The limitations of infrastructure as a flood protection policy were recognized
when Hurricane Betsy killed seventy-six people and flooded 165,000 homes in
1965.226 The scale of devastation caused by large floods-combined with the risk
factors involved-makes flood insurance a financially unpredictable business for
private insurance companies.227 In fact, Congress had passed an experimental
flood insurance program a decade earlier, the Federal Flood Insurance Act of
195 6,228 but lack of interest from the private sector prevented it from getting off
the ground.229 Without insurance, vulnerable floodplain communities are solely
reliant on disaster relief-a situation Hurricane Betsy exposed in dramatic
fashion.230 The federal government stepped in to fill the void by creating the 1968
National Flood Insurance Program ("NFIP"). 23' The rationale appeared logical:
219. Levees: Conditions & Capacity, AM. SocY OF Civ. ENG'RS, http://www.infrastructurereportcard.org/a/
#p/levees/conditions-and-capacity (last visited Apr. 28, 2015).
220. 2013 REPORT CARD, supra note 217, at 1.
221. Dam Failures and Incidents, ASS'N OF STATE DAM SAFETY OFFICIALS, http://www.damsafety.org/news/
?p=412f29c8-3fd8-4529-b5c9-8d47364c lf3e (last visited Apr. 28, 2015).
222. ASS'N STATE DAM SAFETY OFFICIALS, DAM FAILURES, DAM INCIDENTS (NEAR FAILURES), available at
http://www.damsafety.org/media/Documents/PRESSUSFailureslncidents(1).pdf.
223. Michael Grunwald & Susan B. Glasser, Experts Say Faulty Levees Caused Much of Flooding, WASH. POST
(Sept. 21, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/20/AR2005092001894.html.
224. Roger D. Congleton, The Story of Katrina: New Orleans and the Political Economy of Catastrophe, 127
PUB. CHOICE 5, 5-6 (2006).
225. Tarlock, supra note 170, at 166 (describing the pioneering work and legacy of Gilbert White in
developing the flood defense moral hazard problem).
226. See Erwann 0. Michel-Kerjan, Catastrophe Economics: The National Flood Insurance Program, 24 J.
ECON. PERSPECTIVES 165, 165 (2010).
227. See Erwann 0. Michel-Kerjan et al., Policy Tenure Under the U.S. National Flood Insurance Program
(NFIP), 32 RISK ANALYSIS 644, 647 (2012); see also Catastrophe Economics, supra note 226, at 166 (explaining
that the unpredictable nature of disaster damages creates volatility between premiums and claims).
228. Federal Flood Insurance Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-1016 (1956) (repealed 1968).
229. Michel-Kerjan, supra note 226, at 165.
230. See Scott Gabriel Knowles & Howard C. Kunreuther, Troubled Waters: The National Flood Insurance
Program in Historical Perspective, 26 J. PoL'Y HIST. 327, 332 (2014).
231. NFIP was created by the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 4001 (1968).
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the federal government has the capital to initiate such a program, subsidize
insurance for homeowners, and borrow from the U.S. Department of Treasury
during costly flooding years.232 The government can also spread risks across
society while demanding that communities and homeowners implement flood
risk mitigation measures as a condition to the receipt of federally subsidized
insurance.233 Theoretically, the program could incentivize migration away from
high-risk floodplains while protecting communities during the transition. In
reality, subsidized flood insurance incentivizes further development in flood-
plains. Sadly, that scenario was predicted by a federal task force charged with
investigating the feasibility of such a program, but its major recommendations
were ignored.234
The NFIP provides eligible communities with flood insurance, with rates tied
to the degree of risk to which a particular community is exposed. In areas deemed
"Special Flood Hazard Areas"-so-called when subject to a one percent annual
chance of flood-new construction must adhere to certain flood management
requirements, and flood insurance is required when purchasing a home with a
federally-regulated mortgage.235 Older buildings grandfathered into the program
enjoy subsidized insurance rates and less stringent regulations, while new
buildings pay below-market actuarial rates that more accurately reflect risk and
must otherwise comply with flood mitigation requirements.236 Importantly, if a
homeowner in an eligible community declines to purchase flood insurance, any
disaster relief payout in the event of a flood is reduced by the amount of insurance
that could have been purchased.23'
Unfortunately, the program is deeply flawed. Many communities willingly
chose unimpeded development over subsidized insurance that was conditioned
on building code modifications or stringent land-use regulations.238 Within
participating communities, many individuals remain uninsured. More than half of
U.S. counties have insurance penetration rates lower than one percent (including
many counties who experience repeated flooding), 239 possibly due to a lack of
232. Michel-Kerjan et al., supra note 227, at 647.
233. Id.
234. The task force's report states bluntly: "A flood insurance program is a tool that should be used expertly
or not at all. Correctly applied, it could promote wise use of floodplains. Incorrectly applied, it could exacerbate
the whole problem of flood losses." Knowles & Kunreuther, supra note 230, at 333. The report emphasizes that
a national flood insurance program would be most effective in conjunction with a broader national flood control
strategy that managed the entirety of a river basin. Id.
235. DAN HUBER, CTR. FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY SOLUTIONS, FIXING A BROKEN NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE
PROGRAM: RISKS AND POTENTIAL REFORMS 1, 3 (2012), available at http://www.c2es.org/docUploads/flood-
insurance-brief.pdf.
236. Id.
237. Knowles & Kunreuther, supra note 230, at 336.
238. Id. at 337.
239. Michel-Kerjan et al., supra note 227, at 649.
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enforcement capacity.240 Those who purchase insurance typically do so for less
than five years. 241 Buildings grandfathered into the program receive heavily
subsidized rates, but even full actuarial rates do not cover the full risk of flood
damage. 242 Rates set by the program are based on complex maps that struggle to
incorporate evolving human and environmental changes that affect flood risk. 3
Creating and updating maps in this way requires a well-funded agency and
sophisticated techniques, but funding for mapping has been low and inconsis-
tent. 4 As a result, many maps are outdated and do not reflect true risk. 5
In the aggregate, these limitations have created a program that struggles to
accomplish its objectives. By 2013, the NFIP has been forced to borrow $27
billion from the U.S. Department of Treasury to cover the discrepancy between
premiums and actual risk.2 46 Insurance penetration rates are low even in areas
where insurance is mandatory, so many communities are still vulnerable. 247 If
participation in the program is low, then the promise of land use changes and
other mitigation requirements is minimized. Meanwhile, there is little evidence
that higher insurance penetration is associated with lower relief payouts, suggest-
ing that the NFIP has not been successful in reducing disaster relief.248 Most
recently, the Disaster Relief Appropriations Act of 2013 provided $50.7 billion
for Hurricane Sandy victims.
249
The Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012 represented a
recognition that the NFIP and flood policy generally were structurally unsound
and sought to improve mapping and mitigation enforcement capacities while
moving premiums closer to actual risk. 0 Importantly, it also provided vouchers
for low-income households whose rate increases would be severely felt.251 The
reforms did not last long-in March 2014, the Menendez-Grimm Homeowner
Insurance Affordability Act rolled back many of Biggert-Waters' strongest
provisions. 2  Thus, the approach to flood risk in the United States, despite
increasing costs and vulnerability, has remained largely unchanged since the
1960s: a reliance on deteriorating infrastructural projects likes dams and levees to
240. Tarlock, supra note 170, at 168 (noting that banks have been lax in enforcing the mandatory insurance
requirement for mortgages).
241. See generally Michel-Kerjan et al., supra note 227, at 650-57.
242. HUBER, supra note 235, at 3
243. See Knowles & Kunreuther, supra note 230, at 347.
244. Id. at 344.
245. HUBER, supra note 235, at 4.
246. Knowles & Kunreuther, supra note 230, at 328.
247. See HUBER, supra note 235, at 3; Knowles & Kunreuther, supra note 230, at 343.
248. HUBER, supra note 235, at 7.
249. Disaster Relief Appropriations Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-2, 127 Stat. 4 (2013); Knowles &
Kunreuther, supra note 230, at 346.
250. Biggert-Waters Insurance Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-141, §§ 100216, 100225 (2012);
Knowles & Kunreuther, supra note 230, at 329.
251. Knowles & Kunreuther, supra note 230, at 347.
252. Id. at 329.
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prevent floods from occurring, and subsidized insurance and disaster relief when
they inevitably do.
C. WILDFIRE LAW
Section I explored trends in wildfire occurrence in the United States, observing
that the number of fires is decreasing as the burn acreage is increasing.253 This
shift from low-intensity fires at historic return intervals to infrequent but
high-intensity fires may be the result of climate change to some extent,254 but is
chiefly the product of a systematic policy of wildfire suppression that results in
the accumulation of highly flammable fuel loads in forests.255 Accordingly,
wildfires differ from droughts and floods. While the perfect legal framework
could reduce (but not eliminate) vulnerabilities to droughts and floods, forests
could significantly approach their historic fire return interval at low intensity if
wildfire policy were less anthropodominant.
However, wildfire policy has favored an anthropodominant approach for the
past century and bears a striking resemblance to laws that respond to drought and
flood risks. Namely, increasing development in the wildland-urban interface
produces a concomitant increase in wildfire costs to communities and taxpayers.
The policy response is to neutralize the threat by developing and unleashing
technological advancements in wildfire suppression. When that fails or proves
counter-productive, governments provide disaster relief payments to offset dam-
age costs and emergency funding to escalate wildfire suppression efforts.
Federal wildfire suppression emerged as the preferred wildfire management
approach in the early twentieth century, during the same progressive management
era that embraced ambitious levee construction projects to prevent floods.256 The
Forest Transfer Act of 1905 transferred forest management authority from the
Department of the Interior to the Department of Agriculture,257 signaling a shift
towards prioritizing timber resources and the immediate human benefits of forest
resources. Congress subsequently authorized the U.S. Department of Agricul-
ture's ("USDA") Forest Service to receive emergency firefighting funds in
advance, greatly increasing the agency's potential budget and enabling it to
pursue an aggressive fire suppression policy.258 In 1911, the Forest Service's
powers were expanded when high firefighting costs were reimbursed and the
253. See, e.g., Total Wildland Fires and Acres (1960-2009), supra note 68.
254. See, e.g., van Mantgem et al., supra note 70.
255. See, e.g., Stephens et al., supra note 72.
256. See Thomas & Medlock, supra note 199, at 158; Jan W. van Wagtendonk, The History and Evolution of
Wildland Fire Use, 3 FiRE ECOLOGY 3, 3, 4 (2007).
257. Transfer Act of 1905, 16 U.S.C. § 472 (1905).
258. George Busenberg, Wildfire Management in the United States: The Evolution of a Policy Failure, 21
REv. PoE'Y RESEARCH 145, 149 (2004).
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agency was given forest management influence over non-federal lands. 259 Those
developments put the Forest Service on a wildfire suppression trajectory that it
continues to pursue. Congressional preference for firefighting is so strong that
agencies have a strong incentive to pursue wildfire suppression policies because
they know their budget will be left alone or even increased: often funds budgeted
for other programs, including fire prevention, are re-appropriated when fire
suppression budgets run dry,260 and Congress later makes up the difference.
26 1
The Forest Service's fiscal year 2015 proposed budget, for example, requests
$708 million for fire suppression efforts when annual costs from 2011 to 2013
averaged closer to $1.7 billion.2 62 The incentive is so great that, in extreme cases,
firefighters have allowed fires to grow in order to receive increased media
attention and emergency appropriations.2 63
Fire suppression strategies were complemented by technology and infrastruc-
ture improvements in firefighting. In the 1930s, roads, communication lines, and
observation posts were built in forested areas, and the Forest Service organized
large networks of firefighting crews.264 Soon thereafter, crews were provided
with airplanes, helicopters, and surplus military hardware to combat fires across
the country. States signed cooperative fire policy agreements that reinforced the
policy of fire suppression and the federal government's role in it. 2 6 5 The
privatization of fire suppression efforts began in the 1980s and has since created a
"fire industrial complex," in which private contractors are employed to fight fires
with high-tech equipment and large crews. 266 Despite a higher cost for taxpayers,
firefighting agencies and private companies are incentivized to propagate the fire
suppression paradigm to justify their expenditures. 267
Exacerbating the wildfire suppression policy agenda is an increase in wildland-
urban interface development. Forty-four million homes are currently located in
fire-prone areas, and this figure is estimated to reach sixty million by 2030.268 Not
only does a well-publicized fire suppression policy create a moral hazard
problem whereby development increases in fire-prone areas due to a false sense
of security, but at-risk development and private assets also create a moral
259. Id. at 150.
260. Freking, supra note 2 (noting that $400 million to $500 million allocated for other projects would be set
aside for fire suppression, while the Secretary of Agriculture lobbies for more money to fight wildfires).
261. TIMOTHY INGALSBEE, FIREFIGHTERS UNITED FOR SAFETY, ETHICS, & ECOLOGY, GETTING BURNED: A
TAXPAYER'S GUIDE TO WILDFIRE SUPPRESSION COSTS 14 (2010), available at http://www.iawfonline.org/
A%20TAXPAYERS%20GUIDE%20TO%20WILDFIRES.pdf.
262. U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., FISCAL YEAR 2015 BUDGET JUSTIFICATIONS 9-9 (2014).
263. Karen Bradshaw, A Modern Overview of Wildfire Law, 21 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REv. 445, 460 (2011).
264. Busenberg, supra note 258, at 151.
265. Id. at 152.
266. INGALSBEE, supra note 261, at 15.
267. See Karen M. Bradshaw, Backfired! Distorted Incentives in Wildfire Suppression Techniques, 31 UTAH
ENVTL. L. REv. 155, 158 (2011).
268. INGALSBEE, supra note 261, at 3.
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dilemma for firefighters who must make decisions concerning the direction and
priority of firefighting efforts. 269 An audit of firefighting expenditures found that
private property protection drove eighty-seven percent of fire suppression priori-
ties, 2 7 0 despite federal fire management policy suggesting that private property
and the environment should be appropriately balanced.271 While not on the scale
of the NFIP, the government also provides subsidized wildfire insurance for
wildland-urban interface residents, and the private insurers that issue the policies
have little incentive to require fire damage mitigation measures in exchange for
coverage.272 In theory, private homeowners could be held liable for cost recovery
claims (where litigants who bear the costs of wildfire suppression or wildfire
damage can receive compensation from the responsible party), thereby increas-
ing home ownership costs in fire-prone areas. In reality, state cost-recovery suits
are generally aimed at utility companies and, in many states, require a negligence
273determination. Tort laws are therefore unlikely to impede the pace of develop-
ment in the wildland-urban interface. Unabated development in these areas can
be a serious public health concern as well. One study found that disaster relief
recipients had substantially higher rates of post-traumatic stress disorder and
major depression than the population at large.274
Wildfire disaster relief forms the third prong of modern wildfire law. The
Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act of 1988 allows
the President to provide relief to fire victims. 275 Between 2012 and 2013, for
example, FEMA distributed nearly $104 million in federal relief funds.2 76 Other
federal, state, and local agencies contribute as well; in 2003, total rehabilitation
costs for a California fire exceeded $530 million.27 7 Wildfire relief shows
compassion and can be traced back to the early 1800s, 278 but it may also create
269. Bradshaw, supra note 263, at 459 (citing George Nickas, Preserving and Enduring Wilderness:
Challenges and Threats to the National Wilderness Preservation System, 76 DEN. U. L. REv. 449 (1998)).
270. INGALSBEE, supra note 261, at 11.
271. See FIRE EXEC. COUNCIL, GUIDANCE FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF FEDERAL WILDLAND FIRE MANAGEMENT
POLICY (2009), available at http://www.nifc.gov/policies/policies-documents/GIFWFMP.pdf.
272. Bradshaw, supra note 263, at 464-65; see also Richenda Connell et al., Evaluating the Private Sector
Perspective on the Financial Risks of Climate Change, 15 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 133, 139 (2009).
273. See generally Charles Riordan, Calming the Fire: How a Negligence Standard and Broad Cost-
Recovery Can Help Restore National Forests After Wildfires, 41 B.C. ENVTL. ATE. L. REv. 233, 259 (2014).
274. Grant N. Marshall et al., Psychiatric Disorders Among Adults Seeking Emergency Disaster Assistance
After a Wildland- Urban Interface Fire, 58 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 509, 514 (2007).
275. Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance (Stafford) Act, Pub. L. No. 93-288
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121 et seq. (2013)).
276. H. BUDGET COMM., WILDFIRE DISASTER FUNDING ACT (July 9, 2014), available at http://budget.house.gov/
uploadedfiles/wfdfa.pdf (report authorized by Chairman Paul Ryan).
277. See LISA DALE ET AL., W. FORESTRY LEADERSHIP COAL., THE TRUE COST OF WILDFIRE IN THE WESTERN
UNITED STATES 5 (2010), available at http://www.blm.gov/or/districts/roseburg/plans/collab-forestry/files/
TrueCostOfWilfire.pdf.
278. See, e.g., Michele L. Landis, "Let Me Next Time Be 'Tried By Fire"': Disaster Relief and the Origins of
the American Welfare State 1789-1874, 92 Nw. U. L. REv. 967, 968-69 (1998) (describing an 1827 bill
appropriating $20,000 for victims of a fire in Alexandria, Virginia).
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perverse incentives. When individuals expect wildfire disaster relief, for ex-
ample, they reduce their own spending on private mitigation activities like
fire-resistant rooftops and vegetation clearing near the home. 279 This is especially
problematic for poor tenants; landlords may be less likely to invest in fire
prevention upgrades, and undocumented immigrants can also be denied emer-
gency services and shelter in the aftermath of a fire.280
The landscape of wildfire policy in the United States is therefore a grim scene.
The costs of wildfire suppression strain government budgets, while disaster relief
funds, insurance schemes, and fire prevention programs do little to deter
continued development in the wildland-urban interface or to otherwise reduce
wildfire risk. Wildfire damages are increasing, fires are becoming larger and more
severe, and forests are accumulating excessive fuel density that contributes to
high-intensity burns. In 2003, the Healthy Forests Restoration Act made an
attempt to ameliorate these deficiencies by promoting fuel reduction programs
and prescribed burning. 281 But critics named it the "No Tree Left Behind" Act
because it uses fuel reduction projects to justify logging old growth forests and
limits judicial review of such projects.282 As of August 2014, Congressional
debate on wildfire policy was focused on determining which funding mechanism
is most appropriate to support wildfire disaster relief.28 3 An entirely new
approach to wildfire, it seems, is not on the agenda.
D. COMMONALITIES
Section II concluded by observing that after the Neolithic Revolution, agricul-
ture-based societies suffered from the impacts of droughts, floods, and wildfires
for three common reasons. First, individuals, communities, and the society as a
whole were relatively immobile, thereby making it impossible or highly unlikely
that migration away from high-risk areas would occur. Immobility, in turn, led to
over-reliance on, and overconfidence in, human installations that seek to control
nature. Irrigation schemes, dams, dikes, and other flood control structures, and
deforestation were attempts to make nature adapt to human systems, instead of
humans adapting to natural systems. Second, ancient societies vulnerable to
279. See Michael McKee et al., Using Experimental Economics to Examine Wildfire Insurance and Averting
Decisions in the Wildland- Urban Interface, 17 Soc'Y & NAT. RES.: INT'L J. 491, 501 (2004).
280. See generally Albert S. Fu, The Fa(ade of Safety in California's Shelter-In-Place Homes: History,
Wildfire, and Social Consequence, 39 CRITICAL SOCIOLOGY 833, 835 (2013) (describing undocumented
immigrants being denied assistance because they could not provide documentation).
281. See generally Toddi A. Steelman & Melissa Elefante DuMond, Serving the Common Interest in U.S.
Forest Policy: A Case Study of the Healthy Forests Restoration Act, 43 ENVTL. MGMT. 396 (2009).
282. See generally id.; Reda M. Dennis-Parks, Healthy Forests Restoration Act Will It Really Protect
Homes and Communities?, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 639, 653 (2004).
283. See Peter Wong, Wyden: Congress Can Pass Wildfire, O&C Bills This Year, PORTLAND TRIBUNE (Aug.
20, 2014, 4:57 PM), http://portlandtribune.com/sl/230857-94878-wyden-congress-can-pass-wildfire-o-and-c-
bills-this-year.
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droughts, floods, and wildfires exhibited a lack of diversification in their
approach. Whether due to complete reliance on one crop or drainage canal,
disaster mitigation and adaptation tended to focus on one coping strategy at the
expense of a diverse, integrated risk-reduction approach. Finally, communities
showed a lack of awareness of the surrounding environment and the extent to
which anthropocentric policies could be sustained over time. Opportunities were
missed and vulnerabilities overlooked.
Applying this framework to twenty-first century U.S. drought, flood, and
wildfire laws shows a similar pattern. Immobility is perhaps the most obvious, as
development continues in the most drought-prone, flood-prone, and fire-prone
areas. Water law does not encourage relocation; Eastern water rights are appurte-
nant with ownership of riparian lands, those in the West are tied to the water
source, and undeveloped groundwater regimes encourage unsustainable extrac-
tion rates.284 Agricultural policy, meanwhile, favors crop and insurance subsidies
as well as drought disaster relief that reinforce the status quo. Large hydrological
installations like dams, levees, and canals encourage immobility in both drought-
prone and flood-prone areas by bringing water to arid lands and holding it back in
floodplains, providing somewhat false assurance that these areas are fit for
large-scale agricultural and urban development. Flood insurance and disaster
relief also spreads the risk of otherwise unsound settlement across society, further
discouraging mobility. A long-standing policy of wildfire suppression that priori-
tizes private property protection is similarly ineffective in slowing the growth of
development in the wildland-urban interface; insurance programs and disaster
relief exacerbate its effects. The upshot of these policies is that instead of either
promoting migration away from high-risk areas or forcing communities to bear
the risks they expose themselves to, drought, flood, and wildfire laws tend to
deter migration and distort risk.
It would be impractical to assume that the only reasonable response to a
landscape of droughts, floods, and wildfires is to avoid high-risk areas entirely.
However, if development in arid regions, floodplains, and the wildland-urban
interface is to continue, an integrated, diversified approach must account for the
great complexities of natural systems and the ways in which human progress can
safely and sustainably be incorporated into them. Instead, modern drought, flood,
and wildfire policies conform to three basic approaches: First, controlling nature
with dams, levees, irrigation, and wildfire suppression; second, spreading risk
across society through subsidies and insurance programs; and third, providing
ex-post disaster relief. There are a nearly limitless number of additional and
alternative approaches that can be considered to increase societal resilience to
droughts, floods, and wildfires, some of which are explored in Section IV below.
Considering the track record so far, pursuing some of them may be worthwhile.
284. See Krieger, supra note 164.
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That the basic framework of drought, flood, and wildfire laws has remained the
same for the past several decades speaks to the disconnect between humans and
the environment. Efforts to control nature necessarily rely on a belief that control
is possible. But diminishing water supplies, deteriorating and failing infrastruc-
ture, and the rise of high-intensity fires reveal that belief to be premature at best.
The solvency of insurance programs depends on premiums reflecting actual risk,
but the private sector has recognized that droughts, floods, and wildfires are too
complex to reliably predict-a reality that government-backed insurance pro-
grams are struggling with.285 Finally, emergency funding and relief payments
receive broad support because it is easy to sympathize with victims of disasters.
As explained in Section I, the recurrence of droughts, floods, and wildfires
demonstrates that if a disaster strikes that communities were not prepared for, that
disaster was decidedly man-made. Despite tremendous growth in scientific
understanding and technological development, drought, flood, and wildfire laws
exhibit the same vulnerabilities from which Neolithic societies have suffered for
centuries.
IV. LEARNING FROM THE PAST: TOWARDS AN INTEGRATED APPROACH TO
DROUGHTS, FLOODS, AND WILDFIRES
Hunter-gatherers survived in nature for hundreds of thousands of years by
staying mobile, diversified, and aware. While this article does not propose a
return to a nomadic lifestyle, the resilience of human ancestors provides a lens
through which a successful policy framework can be viewed. By promoting these
core principles of resilience, drought, flood, and wildfire laws can move away
from an anthropocentric adaptation paradigm that seeks to control nature, distort
risks, and provide relief after-the-fact, and towards a paradigm that works with
nature, reduces risks, and mitigates damages. There are many approaches that
would contribute to such a transition, and the recommendations below fall into
three broad action categories: discontinuing counter-productive practices, rein-
forcing extant policies that receive inadequate support, and introducing measures
that demonstrate potential to fit the resilience model. There are doubtless many
actions not discussed here that would increase resilience as well, and the actions
below are not presented as an inseparable package. Rather, the framework
approach to droughts, floods, and wildfires itself can adopt the resilience model
by removing policies impeding resilience and introducing policies promoting it
(like mobility), integrating a broad set of policy options (to achieve diversifica-
tion), and remaining responsive to environmental dynamics and change.
285. See generally Knowles & Kunreuther, supra note 230; HUBER, supra note 235.
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A. DROUGHTS
As discussed in Section III, the complexity of droughts and drought response
mechanisms brings together a variety of stakeholders and legal fields. These are,
primarily, state water laws and federal agricultural policies. Vested interests with
water rights, government-backed expectations, and political power present a
significant challenge to status quo disruption. The options presented here,
however, seek not to disturb existing interests as much as incentivizing mitigation
and adaptation. If, however, it becomes apparent that existing or proposed water
uses would decrease resilience to drought (by, for example, appropriating water
at unsustainable rates), it is important to note that states have the constitutional
power (and in some cases, obligation) to modify the status quo or reject
ill-advised changes. The Supreme Court held in Illinois Central Railroad
Company v. Illinois in 1892 that states may dispose of submerged lands only
when disposal does not impair the public interest.286 The case established the
public trust doctrine, imposing on states a duty to protect the public's interest in
water resources and submerged lands. The public trust doctrine's relationship to
state laws of water allocation, such as regulatory permitting schemes and water
markets, was clarified by National Audubon Society v. Superior Court in 1983
when permitted plans to divert water from Mono Lake-California's second
largest lake-to the city of Los Angeles were deemed subject to the state's
ongoing duty to protect the public interest.287 Despite otherwise legal appropria-
tive rights, the Court concluded that "the human and environmental uses of Mono
Lake-uses protected by the public trust doctrine-deserve to be taken into
account. Such uses should not be destroyed because the state mistakenly thought
itself powerless to protect them., 288 Thus, states not only have the power to
protect the public interest within current doctrines of water allocation, they have
an obligation to do so. Drought resilience is doubtlessly within the scope of the
public interest, making the public trust doctrine a powerful tool for states whose
existing legal doctrines exacerbate or do little to mitigate drought conditions.
There are various mechanisms to rein in water consumption within existing
water law frameworks as well. In prior appropriation jurisdictions, many states
are recognizing instream flows-appropriations that abolish the requirement that
water be diverted in order to maintain flow levels-as an effective tool to ensure
adequate reserves exist in times of drought; 28 9 governments and conservation
groups can purchase water rights and simply leave them in place. Similarly,
regulated riparian states can integrate minimum flows into the fabric of the
permitting process, protecting a baseline needed for ecological integrity and
286. See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892).
287. See Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Super. Ct., 33 Cal. 3d 419,441 (Cal. 1983).
288. Id. at 452.
289. THOMPSON JR. ET AL., supra note 145, at 216.
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scarce conditions. 290 Regardless of jurisdiction, water rights can also be condi-
tioned on the availability of water resources, reserving authority to reduce
diversions in drought conditions. 291 Legislation, such as "wild and scenic rivers"
laws or endangered species laws, can similarly be used to mitigate excessive
292consumption.
In this sense, states already have many of the tools they need to mitigate
drought, exhibiting diversified approaches that are so crucial to resilience. What
is lacking then is an awareness of the surrounding environment and the ways that
the options already in existence are inappropriately utilized. This lack of
awareness is most obvious when looking at groundwater management. In
California, for example, groundwater depletion data is not made public, denying
scientists, some government agencies, and the general public access to informa-
tion that could make sense of complex hydrogeological dynamics. 293 That,
combined with having little-to-no restrictions on groundwater extraction,29 4
amounts to turning a blind eye to environmental signals. Across the United
States, groundwater depletion is rarely addressed and poorly documented,295
though not without consequence. If water stored in the High Plains (Ogallala)
Aquifer of the Great Plains is exhausted (and projections show it to be sixty-nine
percent depleted in fifty years), it would take 500 to 1,300 years to replenish a
resource relied on to provide irrigation and drinking water throughout the United
States.2 96 States can start by making information that already exists available, and
move towards funding, or at least permitting, further research into surface and
groundwater depletion and recharge. Modifying or creating state institutions to
address groundwater may increase environmental awareness as well.297
The federal government also has a role to play in water resources allocation.
While statutes such as the Clean Water Act, Endangered Species Act, and Wild
and Scenic Rivers Act have the potential to preserve instream flows in times of
drought,298 the United States lacks an integrated water resources management
plan that provides a coherent vision and places disparate water-related laws and
290. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 373.0421 (2010).
291. THOMPSON JR. ETAL., supra note 145, at 219.
292. Id.
293. Tom Knudson, The Public Eye: As Drought Persists, Frustration Mounts Over Secrecy of California's
Well Drilling Logs, SACRAMENTO BEE (July 6, 2014, 12:00 AM), http://www.sacbee.com/2014/07/06/6534974/
as-drought-persists-frustration.html.
294. But see Reid Wilson, California Debates New Regulations for Diminishing GroundwaterAmid Historic
Drought, WASH. POST BLOG (Aug. 6, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeaUwp/2014/08/06/
california-debates-new-regulations-for-diminishing-groundwater-amid-historic-drought/.
295. U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, supra note 166, at 1.
296. David R. Steward et al., Tapping Unsustainable Groundwater Stores for Agricultural Production in the
High Plains Aquifer of Kansas, Projections to 2110, 110 PROCEEDINGS NAT'L ACAD. Scis., E3477, E3477 (Sept.
10, 2013), available at http://www.pnas.org/contentearly/2013/08/14/1220351110.full.pdf.
297. See id. at E3480.
298. THOMPSON JR. ET AL., supra note 145, at 219-20.
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institutions within a coordinated policy framework. A National Water Commis-
sion equipped to consolidate research and articulate an integrated national policy
direction would be a good start;299 ironically, before the last Commission was
disbanded in 1973, it issued a report criticizing poor coordination and investiga-
tion of water resource issues in the United States. 30 0 The European Union's Water
Framework Directive, for example, has provided a framework within which
innovative ecological monitoring systems have emerged. 30 1 The federal govern-
ment can also play a crucial role in facilitating interstate water management by
encouraging and brokering negotiated agreements, providing a national voice on
basin commissions, and funding research on transboundary water issues. For
example, the federal government joins Delaware, New York, New Jersey, and
Pennsylvania as one of five voting members of the Delaware River Basin
Commission.30 2 In times of drought, the Commission is authorized to reduce
water diversions.30 3
Federal agricultural policy will greatly influence the degree to which drought
resilience in the United States improves. There is an apparent trade-off between
showing compassion for the agricultural sector that feeds the nation, and
discontinuing policies that spread drought risks across society and thereby
disincentivize mitigation.30 4 Certainly, to the extent that commodity subsidies,
crop insurance, and disaster relief do not provide incentives to relocate agricul-
tural production away from drought prone areas, challenging choices need to be
made to balance existing reliance on these policies with the need to preserve
water consumption during drought. Simply abolishing subsidies is not a viable
option. Drought resilience, however, can be enhanced just as well through
inducements as deterrents. The Agricultural Act of 2014, for example, creates an
insurance program for diversified farming operations that work with ecological
processes by diversifying agricultural products and methods.305 Diversified
farming operations retain water better than industrialized farms, thereby making
299. On the Need for a National Water Commission for the 21st Century: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm.
on Water & Power of the H. Comm. on Res., 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of Peter H. Gleick), available at
http://pacinst.org/publication/hearing-on-the-need-for-a-national-water-commission-for-the-21 st-century/.
300. NAT'L WATER COMM'N, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE 115 (1973).
301. Tarlock, supra note 170, at 174 n. 140 (citing Daniel Hering et al., The European Water Framework
Directive at the Age of 10: A Critical Review of the Achievements with Recommendations for the Future, 408
Sci. TOTAL ENV'T 4007, 4008 (2010)).
302. DEL. RIVER BASIN COMM'N, DELAWARE RIVER BASIN COMPACT 3, 4 (1961), available at http://
www.state.nj.us/drbc/library/documents/compact.pdf.
303. Id. at 8.
304. See generally Adler, supra note 19 (exploring contradictory policy goals of spreading risk and
increasing drought resilience).
305. 2014 Farm Bill Drilldown: Subsidy Reform and Fair Competition, NAT'L SUSTAINABLE AGRIC. COAL.
(Feb. 14, 2014), http://sustainableagriculture.nedblog/farm-bill-subsidy-reform/.
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them more resistant to drought.3 °6 A crop relocation program would be an even
stronger measure to increase drought resilience. Providing tax breaks, higher
subsidies, direct loans, preferential disaster relief, or other incentives to farmers
willing to relocate their crops from water-scarce areas to water-abundant areas, or
to areas where crops consume less water, would reduce stress on arid regions and
improve agricultural mobility in response to drought.30 7
Crop subsidies can also do more to increase drought resilience. In particular,
subsidies can consider the water footprint, or virtual water demand, of crops.
Water footprint assessments can be used to determine where and how much water
is being consumed by various activities, in order to redistribute water consump-
tion towards more water efficient and economically productive uses. 30 8 The
virtual water trade refers to the invisible water consumed to create exports or
imports. By using this approach, states or countries can increase drought
resilience by importing water-intensive goods to water-scarce regions, instead of
producing those goods domestically.30 9 Countries in the arid Middle East, for
example, have dramatically reduced their water consumption by simply import-
ing grains instead of growing them.3 10 Crop subsidies in the United States that
influence commodity markets can similarly be employed to promote or dissuade
domestic crop production based on water footprints. The United States has one of
the highest virtual water deficits in the world;3 11 rectifying that imbalance would
significantly increase drought resilience.
A consideration of water footprints and virtual water would also call into
question the wisdom of an oligopoly-controlled meat industry in the United
States. Part of the water footprint problem can be attributed to high meat
consumption per capita (4.5 times the global average), as well as high water
consumption per unit (14,500 m3/ton per kilogram of bovine meat, compared to
9,900 m3/ton in the United Kingdom). 12 Because water footprint increases with
every caloric conversion in the supply chain, animal meat is a water inefficient
306. Claire Kremen & Albie Miles, Ecosystem Services in Biologically Diversified Versus Conventional
Farming Systems: Benefits, Externalities, and Trade-Offs, 17 ECOLOGY & Soc'Y 153, 162 (2012).
307. See, e.g., Joep E Schyns & Arjen Y. Hoekstra, The Added Value of Water Footprint Assessment for
National Water Policy: A Case Study for Morocco, 9 PLOS ONE 1, 1 (June 2014) (describing the economic
benefits of crop relocation in Morocco).
308. IHE DELFI, VIRTUAL WATER TRADE: PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL EXPERT MEETING ON VIRTUAL
WATER TRADE, VALUE OF WATER RES. REP. SERIES 12, 14 (A.Y. Hoeksrta ed., 2003).
309. Id.
310. Id. at 137.
311. M.M. MEKONNEN & A.Y. HOEKSTRA, UNESCO-IHE INST. FOR WATER EDUC., 2 NATIONAL WATER
FOOTPRINT ACCOUNTS: THE GREEN, BLUE AND GREY WATER FOOTPRINT OF PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION 4
(2011), available at http://www.waterfootprint.org/Reports/Report50-NationaWaterFootprints-Vol2.pdf.
312. M.M. MEKONNEN & A.Y. HOEKSTRA, UNESCO-IHE INST. FOR WATER EDUC., 1 NATIONAL WATER
FOOTPRINT ACCOUNTS: THE GREEN, BLUE AND GREY WATER FOOTPRINT OF PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION 27
(2011), available at http://www.waterfootprint.org/Reports/Report50-NationaWaterFootprints-Voll.pdf.
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method of food production.31 3 The meat packing industry's grip on regulatory
change is so strong, however, that the 2014 Agricultural Act's omission of a law
that would have undermined the Department of Agriculture's regulatory authority
was considered a huge success for producers.314 Therefore, direct regulation of
the meat industry (to introduce water efficiency standards, for example) appears
unlikely. Nonetheless, employing an inducement approach can incentivize pro-
duction and consumption of agricultural products lower on the food chain.
Many other measures could contribute to diversifying the drought resilience
policy portfolio. Vertical farming in urban areas could be less water-intensive and
conducted in water-abundant regions, promoting agricultural mobility.315 Simply
fixing what infrastructure already exists could alleviate water stress-an esti-
mated 240,000 water mains break every year in the United States.316 That
approach would be expensive but necessary, absent more fundamental lifestyle
changes.317 Other improvements to water efficiency, reuse, and stormwater
capture also show promise.318 Ultimately though, drought resilience will be
maximized by pursuing policies that encourage mobility (e.g., crop relocation,
virtual water trading), diversification (e.g., development of a national integrated
water resources management framework), and awareness of changes in the
environment (e.g., diversified farming operations, groundwater monitoring).
B. FLOODS
Flood law in the United States rests on three pillars: federal management of
large infrastructural projects to control floods, an insurance program that spreads
the cost of high-risk development across society, and disaster relief. As detailed
in Section III, this approach does not appear to create a sufficiently resilient
framework. Infrastructure inevitably deteriorates and sometimes fails, while
subsidized insurance and disaster relief do not promote flood mitigation measures
313. See generally Arjen Y. Hoekstra, The Hidden Water Resource Use Behind Meat and Dairy, 2 ANIMAL
FRONTIERS 1, 1 (Apr. 2012) (examining the water footprint of meat and dairy products).
314. See 2014 Farm Bill Drilldown, supra note 305; see also Christopher Leonard, Meat Industry 1, Obama
Administration 0, SLATE (Mar. 4, 2014, 7:52 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/life/food/2014/03/meat racket
excerpt-how-the-grain inspecton packers and stockyard administration.html (reviewing the meat industry's resil-
ience to regulatory reform).
315. Tim Heath & Yiming Shao, Vertical Farms Offer a Bright Futurefor Hungry Cities, THE CONVERSATION
(July 21, 2014, 6:10 AM), http://theconversation.com/vertical-farms-offer-a-bright-future-for-hungry-cities-
26934.
316. Drinking Water: Conditions & Capacity, AM. Soc'Y CIv. ENG'RS, http://www.infrastucturereportcard.org/
a/#p/drinking-water/conditions-and-capacity (last visited Apr. 28, 2015).
317. The Environmental Protection Agency estimates that rehabilitating water systems would cost $335
billion. Drinking Water: Investment & Funding, AM. Soc'Y Civ. ENG'RS, http://www.infrastructurereportcard.org/
a/#p/drinking-water/investment-and-funding (last visited Apr. 28, 2015).
318. See PETER GLEICK ET AL., NAT. RES. DEF. COUNCIL, THE UNTAPPED POTENTIAL OF CALIFORNIA'S WATER
SUPPLY: EFFICIENCY, REUSE, AND STORMWATER (2014), available at http://www.nrdc.org/water/files/ca-water-
supply- solutions-capstone-IB.pdf.
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like migration away from floodplains or modifications to the built environment.
Existing policies do not promote mobility, diversification, or awareness of
environmental dynamics. When exploring solutions, two realities must be recon-
ciled. From a cultural point of view, humans enjoy living next to bodies of water.
This may derive from an evolutionary need to be located next to water,319 or may
simply be attributed to a common affinity for the aquatic aesthetic. 320 Living
close to water bodies is not purely a cultural advantage, however. Floodplains are
sometimes the only reliable source of arable land,32 1 while port facilities on rivers
and coasts provide access to international trade through global shipping net-
works. Ports provide jobs and income for regions and the United States as a
whole, 322 as do industries that capitalize on freshwater and coastal tourism.
323
While a wholesale migration away from floodplains could dramatically reduce
vulnerabilities, the value of flood resilience must be weighed against the benefits
of floodplain development. Those trade-offs notwithstanding, complete migra-
tion is not the only measure capable of promoting flood resilience. Recalling the
hunter-gatherer resilience model, policies that promote mobility, diversification,
and awareness can provide incremental reductions in vulnerability.
The absence of a national integrated water resources management framework
has significance in the flooding context as well. Along with irrigating farmland
and controlling water supply, flood control and resilience are other benefits
provided by large water projects. That these projects are not placed in a
basin-wide management framework makes holistic consideration of costs and
benefits unlikely. For example, the interstate water conflict between Georgia,
Alabama, and Florida mentioned above centers around the management and
downstream impacts of Lake Lanier, a lake originally created for flood control
purposes, not water supply.324 A national vision for water management that
integrates flood resilience into a broader water management framework would
promote policy diversification and environmental awareness by creating a
foundation for basin-level management to build on, while appropriately recogniz-
319. See, e.g., FINLAYSON, supra note 81, at 37.
320. One way to measure this reality is through a comparison of residential housing prices. In one study, for
example, a lakefront view increased property values by 126.7%, while an unobstructed ocean view increased
property values by 58.9%. Earl D. Benson et al., Pricing ResidentialAmenities: The Value of a View, 16 J. REAL
ESTATE FIN. & ECON. 55, 68 (1988).
321. See Reycraft, supra note 114, at 99.
322. The port of Los Angeles, for example, claims to generate 3.3 million jobs in the United States, as well as
$27 billion in state and federal tax revenue. Economic Impact, PORT OF LOS ANcI&ES, http://www.portoflosangeles.org/
finance/economic-impact.asp (last visited Apr. 28, 2015).
323. The direct and indirect contribution of Miami tourist expenditures in 2013 was $34.2 billion, for
example. GREATER MIAMI CONVENTION & VISITORS BUREAU, 2013 VISITOR INDUSTRY OVERVIEW 1, 23 (2013),
available at http://www.miamiandbeaches.com//media/files/gmcvb/partners/research%20statistics/annual-
report_2013.
324. See Robert Hasekell Abrams, Settlement of the ACF Controversy: Sisyphus at the Dawn of the 21st
Century, 31 HAMLINE L. REV. 686, 686 (2008).
[Vol. 27:393
PALEO PERSPECTIVES ON DISASTER LAW
ing that water affects many different policy areas including flooding. Coordina-
tion and direction of these disparate policy areas can improve information
gathering and processing. The European Union's Water Framework Directive, for
example, includes a Floods Directive that requires member states to develop
risk-management plans.325 The Floods Directive induced drought resilience
policies at the national level.32 6
A coherent vision or an integrated management framework could contribute to
alleviating the piecemeal construction and maintenance of the thousands of dams
and levees in various states of disrepair as well. Episodic water resource
development acts fund local infrastructure projects, but neither the Army Corps
of Engineers nor any other agency is authorized to prioritize projects or organize
them strategically. 327 In this way, current funding structures show a general
disregard for environmental feedbacks and, therefore, basin-level flood resil-
ience. A coherent federal framework that coordinates flood control funding and
incorporates basin-level data and information into future planning would im-
prove resilience and, by creating a mechanism that allocates funding based on
risk-based environmental rather than political factors, reduce the overall costs of
infrastructure spending as well.
Working with nature, not against it, can simultaneously increase flood resil-
ience while decreasing reliance on aging infrastructure by recognizing and
cultivating the ecosystem services that natural flood protection systems provide.
Natural flood protection incorporates natural elements that can prevent floods
from occurring (e.g., forested areas redirect or absorb rainfall, reducing surface
runoff and river discharge levels) or mitigate their impact when they do (e.g.,
wetlands provide retention space for floodwaters). 32 Natural flood protection
addresses two prongs of the resilience model: natural flood protection provides
an alternative to infrastructure projects and diversifies the flood policy portfolio
while increasing awareness and integration of environmental processes by
directly incorporating them into flood policy. Some communities have already
embraced the concept, 329 but many areas that show high potential for natural
325. Tarlock, supra note 170, at 173.
326. Scotland used the Floods Directive to create the Flood Risk Management Act, which considers the
potential of natural features to mitigate flood risks. Tarlock, supra note 170, at 174 n. 141 (quoting Chris Spray
et al., Bridging the Water Law, Policy, Science Interface: Flood Risk Management in Scotland, 20 WATER L. 165,
171-72 (2009)).
327. See id. at 175.
328. Stoyan Nedkov & Benjamin Burkhard, Flood Regulating Ecosystem Services Mapping Supply and
Demand, in the Etropole Municipality, Bulgaria, ECOLOGICAL INDICATORS 67, 68 (2012).
329. The Santa Clara Valley's Water District, for example, integrates natural flood protection into a broader
water management plan. Natural Flood Protections, SANTA CLARA VALLEY WATER DIST., http://www.valleywater.
org/services/naturalfloodprotection.aspx (last visited Apr. 28, 2015); see also ENVIL. PROT. AGENCY, WETLANDs:
PROTECTING LIFEAND PROPERTY FROM FLOODING (2006), available at http://water.epa-gov/type/wetlands/outreach/upload/
Flooding.pdf (describing various natural flood protection approaches in the United States).
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flood protection development are missing the opportunity.330 Flood laws can
foster a more natural approach by providing grants, loans, or other incentives to
public and private floodplain managers.
Addressing obstacles to mobility may be a more challenging endeavor. Aside
from the cultural and economic incentives of living in flood-prone areas, there are
significant legal hurdles to overcome. Governments that take steps to dampen
development in flood-prone areas put themselves at risk of takings jurisprudence
that protects property owners from being surprised by regulations affecting their
property or from bearing a disproportionate burden of the regulation. In Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, for example, the Supreme Court held that a state
regulation that prohibited development on barrier islands that are both highly
flood-prone and provide flood protection to coastal communities was a taking
requiring compensation.331 Even administrative permit conditions may be lim-
ited in promoting flood resilience. In Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Manage-
ment District, the Supreme Court ruled that requiring the applicant to fulfill
certain mitigation requirements to obtain a permit (such as wetlands restoration)
constituted an impermissible government taking.332 Clearly then, laws and
regulations that dissuade development or mitigate damages in flood-prone areas
will have to reconcile existing interests, a formidable but not insurmountable
challenge. For example, Davenport, Iowa, uses building codes and natural flood
protection systems to restrict development in Mississippi River floodplains,
gradually relocating development to upland areas.333
Fitting the National Flood Insurance Program ("NFIP") into a more resilient
flood policy framework is also a surmountable challenge. The fact that insurance
penetration is low even in high-risk areas has several implications.334 First, it
suggests that the moral hazard problem-in which providing insurance at
premiums that do not reflect risk incentivizes further development in floodplains-
may be more theoretical than observed. One would expect property owners to
jump at the chance to receive flood insurance at rates that do not reflect actuarial
risk; that they have not suggests that planning for extreme events is not a priority
relative to opportunity costs, and that subsidized insurance was not a significant
factor in the migration to begin with. If migration toward flood-prone areas is
caused by other factors, then targeting the NFIP to redirect development may be
ineffective. Low insurance penetration also implies that the NFIP may not be the
best vehicle to promote local mitigation measures like land-use controls and
building code reforms. Diversifying the policy portfolio to include flood mitiga-
330. A variety of tools and models are available to assist communities in assessing the potential benefits of
flood protection ecosystem services. Nedkov & Burkhard, supra note 328, at 67.
331. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1031 (1992).
332. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2590 (2013).
333. Tarlock, supra note 170, at 156 & n. 21 (citing DAVENPORT, IOWA CODE §§ 15.44.010-.270 (2000)).
334. See Michel-Kerjan et al., supra note 227, at 645, 647.
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tion measures in exchange for assistance from other federal aid programs is
therefore appropriate.
For environmental justice reasons alone, however, it would be unwise to scrap
the NFIP altogether.335 Rather, targeted improvements can make the NFIP a
contributory piece of flood resilience. First, the program needs to show improved
awareness of the surrounding environment by reinforcing the capacity of technol-
ogy experts involved in the flood mapping process. Increasing the number and
expertise of staff, as well as the sophistication of their tools, would help
premiums reflect actual risk. Second, legislation-such as the 2012 Biggert-
Waters Act-should ensure that actual risk is indeed the goal, and promote
long-term solvency of the program. Solvency can partly be achieved by improv-
ing the flood mapping process to ascertain risk, improving mechanisms that
enforce mandatory participation, and further incentivizing mitigation. If all
available mitigation measures were adopted, flood damage could be reduced to
three percent of present-day levels.336 Moving in that direction could be achieved
by tying long-term insurance to properties or through building code regulations
that raise the bar on flood projections.337 Adoption of even a few of these
proposals would increase diversification of flood resilience approaches.
Improving the ability of the NFIP to reduce flood damage would have the
corollary effect of reducing reliance on disaster relief. While disaster relief may
have some unintended consequences that impede flood resilience (e.g., delaying
mitigation because rehabilitation funds will be available), it is unlikely that
governments will cease providing disaster relief for two reasons. First, politicians
receive immense pressure to provide relief in the days and weeks following
disasters, evidenced by higher disaster declarations and relief payouts in election
years.338 Second, the precedent set by disaster relief creates expectations that
relief will always be provided, requiring ever higher relief payouts to receive
political rewards. 3 39 These dynamics hold for flooding disasters as well as
droughts and wildfires. One solution to the spiral could be a well-publicized cap
on disaster relief, putting the public on notice that increasing disaster funds will
not be available. 340 A cap relieves politicians of the pressure to increase relief
funds, while encouraging mitigation in high-risk areas. Another solution, how-
ever, would be to set aside a portion of disaster relief funds for payouts that
335. Many low-income communities are located in high-risk areas that lack mitigation features. These
communities are not well-positioned to migrate to lower-risk areas. See, e.g., J. Chakraborty et al., Social and
Spacial Inequities in Exposure to Flood Risk in Miamt Florida, NATURAL HAZARDS REV. 1, 1 (Aug. 2014).
336. HUBER, supra note 235, at 8.
337. Id. at 9.
338. Erwann Michel-Kerjan & Jacqueline Volkman-Wise, The Risk of Ever-Growing Disaster Relief
Expectations 4 (Risk Mgmt. & Decision Process Ctr., Wharton Sch. U. Pa., Working Paper 09, 2011), available
at http://opim.wharton.upenn.edu/risk/library/WP2011-09_ReliefExpectations.pdf.
339. Id.
340. Id. at 20.
2015]
THE GEORGETOWN INT'L ENVTL. LAW REVIEW
promote mobility away from floodplains or arid regions and the wildland-urban
interface. Offering to purchase properties at higher than market value, for
example, would encourage conversion of high-risk properties into natural flood
protection areas and create a path for property owners to migrate without
incurring unreasonable expenses. Relief payments can also be conditioned on
building mitigation measures into reconstruction at subsidized costs. Funding for
these approaches would be prohibitively expensive under most political condi-
tions, but disaster relief provides an opportunity to capitalize on funds that would
otherwise inhibit mobility.
The current framework of flood resilience in the United States-infrastructure,
government insurance, and disaster relief-is both flawed and entrenched. The
resilience model, however, can be used to reduce vulnerabilities and move
towards a more proactive, integrated approach. A national vision or coordinating
agency for flood resilience would increase environmental awareness through
systematic research and information-sharing while ensuring that localized flood
protection measures are placed in a broader context. Ecosystem services can be
utilized to diversify policy options while moving away from a reliance on
existing infrastructure. Flood insurance can more effectively be utilized to
promote mitigation and dissuade floodplain development, while disaster relief
can be harnessed to induce mobility and land-use conversion to increase
resilience.
C. WILDFIRES
The resilience model applied to wildfire law in the United States suggests that
two basic modifications to the current approach are needed. On the one hand,
managing forests to prevent high-intensity fires by reducing fuel loads or
permitting low-intensity fires is straightforward. Moving away from heavy
reliance on wildfire suppression would diversify policy options and represent
acceptance of environmental feedbacks. On the other hand, slowing migration to,
and development in, the wildland-urban interface will require a more complex,
gradual approach to induce mobility.
In many ways the limitations of wildfire suppression have already been
recognized. Prescribed burns, for example, were authorized as far back as the
1960s.34 1 Today, the USDA's National Cohesive Wildland Fire Management
Strategy outlines a vision for the twenty-first century that acknowledges the
limitations of suppression as well as the benefits of prevention: "To safely and
effectively extinguish fire, when needed; use fire where allowable; manage our
natural resources; and as a Nation, live with wildland fire.",342 The strategy is
341. Busenberg, supra note 258, at 152.
342. U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR & U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., THE NATIONAL STRATEGY: THE FINAL PHASE IN THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATIONAL COHESIVE WILDLAND FIRE MANAGEMENT STRATEGY 1 (2014).
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relatively progressive and well-informed, showing awareness of the surrounding
environment and the impacts of a long-standing preference for wildfire suppres-
sion, while proposing a diverse set of policy options.343
Unfortunately, the National Cohesive Wildland Fire Management Strategy
shows signs of preserving the status quo as well, most strikingly by enumerating
wildfire suppression as the highest priority.344 While the strategy is appreciative
of approaches that work with nature instead of against it, it is not aggressive in
prioritizing them and does not explore options to reduce development in the
wildland-urban interface.345 Simply put, in order to achieve policy diversity and
integration of environmental processes, the ratio of wildfire suppression spending
to wildfire prevention spending must be balanced. While prescribed burns are not
always politically popular,346 they provide an opportunity to return fire intervals
to historic rates, mimicking some of the benefits of naturally occurring low-
intensity fires. Similarly, mechanical fuel reduction programs can be both
labor-intensive and costly,347 but offer significant job creation potential and
damage savings down the line. Focusing on economic dimensions provides
political cover to restructure funding priorities towards proactive wildfire poli-
cies. Once prioritized, wildfire prevention funds should be protected from
encroachment by excessive wildfire suppression costs. The 2009 Federal Land
Assistance, Management, and Enhancement ("FLAME") Act made an attempt to
protect wildfire prevention funds, but it was undermined by subsequent cuts in
the overall wildfire budget. 348 Renewed calls for fuel reduction programs too
often focus on logging as a solution, 349 but Section II above demonstrates that
simply cutting down the forest is not a prudent management approach. Integrated
forest management that considers natural forest cycles and the ecosystem
services they provide will better contribute to wildfire resilience by diversifying
policies and incorporating environmental dynamics.
Wildfire resilience can also be achieved by reducing assets in the wildland-
urban interface. Deterring development in, or inducing migration away from,
forested areas encounters similar takings challenges and resistance from the
343. See id. at 6.
344. See id. at 1.
345. Despite acknowledging the rate of growth. See id. at 38.
346. A prescribed burn that escaped control near Los Alamos, New Mexico, for example, caused $1 billion in
damages. Busenberg, supra note 258, at 153.
347. Estimated costs of mechanical fuel reduction range from $35 to $1,000 per acre. Considering that there
may be 28 million acres of forest ripe for fuel reduction in the American West alone, total costs could be
upwards of $980 million to $28 billion. U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., FOREST SERV., A STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT OF
FOREST BIOMASS AND FUEL REDUCTION TREATMENTS IN WESTERN STATES 1 (2003), available at http://
www.fs.fed.us/research/pdf/Western final.pdf.
348. See Rocky Barker, FLAME Act Fails to Curb Fires; Simpson Wants Them Declared as Disasters, IDAHO
STATESMAN (Aug. 28, 2013), http://archives.mtexpress.com/index2.php?ID =2007147772&var Year= 2013&var
Month= 08&varDay= 28#.VPDXW1PF-iZ.
349. See id.
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vested interests concerning floodplain development detailed above. But deter-
rence can be promoted through a similar combination of migration-focused
disaster relief and financial incentives (e.g., tax breaks and improved loan terms)
and incremental land-use regulations. While wildfire prevention policies like
prescribed burns, mechanical fuel reduction, and community mitigation are being
pursued to varying degrees, there is a legal and policy vacuum with respect to
mobility-focused approaches. This vacuum is not explained by a lack of need, as
nearly a third of all housing units are located in the wildland-urban interface, a
figure expected to rise.350 Not only does development increase damage when
fires occur, it also increases the likelihood that fires will start in the first place:
people now cause eighty-five percent of wildfires.35 1 As with flooding, inducing
population relocations to increase wildfire resilience will incur trade-offs, but
they can be incrementally achieved through incentives over time.
Other measures to increase wildfire resilience mirror reforms to drought and
flood law. Any government role in wildfire insurance should be met with
premiums that reflect actual risk. Disaster relief should be capped to reduce
expectations and promote adoption of mitigation features, as well as channel
funds toward migration and conservation incentives. The increasing incidence of
high-intensity wildfires and consequent damages paint a fairly simple portrait of
a landscape being improperly managed. Assets should be moved out of harm's
way, known solutions should receive more attention, and the natural cycle of
forest growth and fire return should be incorporated into the fabric of wildfire law
and policy.
CONCLUSION
Droughts, floods, and wildfires have been features of the American landscape
for millennia. From the Pleistocene to the Holocene to what many now call the
Anthropocene, humans and their evolutionary ancestors have been faced with
extreme natural events and forced to adapt or suffer the consequences. Twenty-
first century climate change is exacerbating the cyclical ecological forces driving
droughts, floods, and wildfires, but that alone is nothing new. Casting droughts,
floods, and wildfires to the sidelines of a larger and more complex contemporary
climate change debate threatens to miss the point: measures to increase resilience
to extreme natural events are available now with or without climate change
action, and conversely, vulnerabilities will remain if climate change mitigation is
the only approach taken.
350. U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., FOREST SERV., WILDFIRE, WILDLANDS, AND PEOPLE: UNDERSTANDING AND
PREPARING FOR WILDFIRE IN THE WILDLAND-URBAN INTERFACE 10 (2013), available at http://www.fs.fed.us/
openspace/fote/reports/GTR-299.pdf.
351. Id. at 15.
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For hundreds of thousands of years, hunter-gatherers survived and evolved as a
result of extreme droughts, floods, and wildfires. They did so despite extraordi-
nary ecological changes they could not dream of controlling, adapting themselves
to the new realities of their environment. Some approaches worked, and inevita-
bly some did not. But a hominid record that stretches millions of years reveals a
model for resilience to extreme natural events like droughts, floods, and wildfires. First
and foremost, they were mobile. For some hunter-gatherer societies this meant the
entire community migrated to a more favorable environment; for others, the relocations
were temporary. Whatever the extent, societies that prioritized mobility were successful
in removing people and assets from harm's way. Second, their approaches were
diversified. Societies were adept at recognizing and exploiting many potential food
sources and ecosystem services. Mobility and diversification, in turn, were made
possible by a sophisticated awareness of the surrounding environment. Ecological
changes and opportunities were recognized and effectively integrated into community
decision-making processes. These characteristics of the Paleolithic hunter-gatherer-
mobility, diversification, and awareness-allowed societies to survive for thousands, if
not millions of years.
The Neolithic Revolution brought a fundamental shift to the human lifestyle.
Agricultural systems require settlement and management of a static area. When a
drought, flood, or wildfire strikes the region, escape to more favorable conditions
is not possible. The vulnerabilities of this approach are exacerbated by reliance
on one or a limited number of shortsighted resilience strategies, such as cutting
down a forest or building a dam. What mitigation options remain are not
capitalized on due to a low level of awareness of the surrounding environment
and its feedbacks, or because there is an inability to effectively translate
awareness into meaningful policy change. These characteristics of vulnerable
civilizations are apparent in the legal frameworks of the United States. The
totality of drought, flood, and wildfire laws and policies conforms to three basic
approaches: (1) controlling nature; (2) spreading risk across society; and, (3)
providing ex-post disaster relief. The first approach utilizes impressive feats of
human engineering and ingenuity, but inadequately considers the consequences
of modifying natural systems. Relying on infrastructure is equally problematic,
because built structures are prone to deteriorate and fail. Spreading risks across
society by subsidizing insurance premiums for people and property in high-risk
areas is compassionate and may promote other policy interests, but for purposes
of building resilience to extreme natural events, it is not productive and may
actually be counterproductive. The current trend of distributing generous disaster
relief packages to affected communities is similarly compassionate but ineffec-
tual in building resilience. Taken together, the paradigm of disaster law in the
United States boils down to strategies that control nature or, should that fail,
reactively soften the blow.
Promoting mobility in the current framework does not mean relocating an
entire metropolis. Simply not rewarding development in high-risk areas would
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encourage alternative thinking. More proactive policies to entice relocation
would also diminish the number of people and amount of assets at risk, and they
would pay for themselves down the road. The pool of policy options available to
build resilience is expansive, encompassing integrated national strategy develop-
ment to local-scale ecosystem services maximization. American communities
and the country as a whole will be substantially less vulnerable if changes in the
environment are continually monitored and translated into holistic policy changes.
This will not only avert disaster either-there are opportunities and synergies
between humans and the natural environment that are currently being missed. It
is unlikely that the densely populated agricultural societies of the Anthropocene
will return to a nomadic hunting and gathering lifestyle. Nonetheless, millions of
years of human evolution and adaptation to droughts, floods, and wildfires tell a
success story that has long been disregarded. For the sake of collective resilience
to extreme events, taking another look and a new approach is necessary. Despite
the differences in human lifestyles, droughts, floods, and wildfires have been
constant features of humans in their environment. The resilience model of the
past provides a paleo perspective on contemporary legal frameworks and can
helpfully inform the future.
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